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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Deuelopment^ s: 
(UNCTAD) Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences came into 
force on the 6th October 1983 and to see to its implemen­
tation, West African countries, like other nations, have 
set up National Bodies and Legislations. One aspect of 
the implementation scheme has been the setting up of 
Freight Booking Centres by most countries for the ”a 
priori” control of their allocated A0% share of their 
trade, a move which came under severe criticism by the 
Lines from developed countries, who are members of the 
Conferences operating to West Africa, notably the United 
Kingdom - West Africa Joint Service (UKWAL) and the 
Continent - West Africa Conference (COWAC),
West Africa Shipping Lines, like most lines in the third 
World see this move as the only way to make sure that 
their share is carried on their National fleet, and 
despite the opposition' from the European Lines, their 
Governments are going ahead to see to it that the 
"a priori" control scheme becomes effective...
Before the advent of the Code,, in most of the Conferences 
which Shipping Lines from West Africa participate, a 
lion^s share of the cargo went to European' Lines, For 
example in the UKWAL which has a membership of eight
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Lines, (two from UK, five from West Africa, one cross 
trade) the two Lines from UK had 50% of the Conference 
Pool cargo (See Table 3,2), about 80^ of the total cargo 
carried by the Conference to West Africa were destined 
for Nigeria, but her National Line,, the Nigeria National 
Shipping Line (NNSL) a member of the Conference had only 
31,5^ of the Pool Cargo.
It is therefore the objective of this paper to find out 
whether the West Africa members of the Conferences ■« 
operating to the sub-region can use the various schemes 
which their Governments are setting up and backed by the 
UNCTAD Code to change the operation of the Conferences toi 
their advantage, and if they can, what the future of these 
Conferences will be.
Chapter One of this paper will discuss the main features 
of the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conference while 
Chapter Two takes on the general over—view of Liner 
Shipping in West Africa. In Chapter Three light will be 
thrown on- the various measures being taken by West African 
countries to implement the UNCTAD Code. Special attention 
will be paid to measures taken by Ghana and Ivory Coast.
In Chapter Four, light will be thrown on. Liner Shipping in 
Ghana making special reference to how the code affects 
liner shipping in Gharra as a whole, and her National Line, 
Black Star Line in particular. Chapter Five is devoted to
3
4
a discussion on what is happening in UKUJAL and COUJAC 
with the coming into force of the code, especially 
regarding Membership and also member Lines'percentage 
share of Pool cargo. Chapter Six is for assessment and 
conclusion.
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CHAPTER ONE
1.1 DEFINITIONS
The foilowing definitions are given in Part One,
Chapter 1 of the "United Nations Conference of Pleni­
potentiaries on' a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences", 
and the discussions in this paper will be restricted to 
these definitions,
Mr
1.1.1 LINER CONFERENCE OR CONFERENCE
This is defined as a group of two or more vessel 
operating carriers which provides international liner 
services for the carriage of cargo on a particular 
route or routes uithirr specified geographical limits 
and which has an agreement or arrangement, whatever its 
nature, within the framework of which they operate under 
uniform or common- freight rates and any other agreed 
conditions with respect to the provisions of liner 
services,.
1.1.2 NATIONAL SHIPPING LINE
A national shipping line of any given country is a vessel 
operating carrier which has its head office of management 
and its effective control in that country and is recognised 
as such by an appropriate authority of that country or 
under the law of that country.
■y
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Lines belonging to and operated by a joint venture 
involving two or more countries and in', whose equity the 
national interests, public and/or private, of those 
countries have a substantial share and whose head office 
of managsment and whose effective control is in one of 
those countries can be recognised as a national line by 
the appropriate authorities of these countries,
1.1.3 THIRD COUNTRY SHIPPING LINE (CROSS TRADER)
uc
A vessel—operating carrier in its operations between two 
countries of which it is not a national shipping line.
1.1.4 SHIPPERS ORGANISATION
5
An association or equivalent body which promotes, 
represents and protects the interest of shippers, and if 
those authorities so desire, is recognised in that 
capacity by the appropriate authority or authorities of 
the country whose shippers it represents,
1.1.5 APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY
Either government or a body designated by a government or 
by national legislation to perform any of the functions 
ascribed to such authority by the provisions of the code,.
6
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1,2 THE-MAIN SUBSTANTIUE PROUISIOMS OF THE CODE
Before discussing the main aspects of the code, a quick 
glance at the main substantive provisions of the code 
will- be useful. These are abstracted belowr
- Article 1 establishes, subject to stated criteria 
right to membership of Conferences of national and 
third flag shipping lines
- Article 2 sets out, with the proviso ■*
’’Unless otherwise mutually agreed", the principle of 
equal shares in any pooling or other similar arrangemeht 
for Liners in importing and exporting countries, with 
’a significant share’’ indicatively given- as 20^ to third 
flag lines where such exist.
Article 7 notes that loyalty arrangements with shippers 
are authorised by that they should be based on the 
contract system or any other system which is also 
lawful
- Article 9 provides that tariffs and related conditions 
and/or regulations should be made available at reason­
able cost to shippers and other parties concerned
- Article ID provides for annual reporting by Conferences 
of their activities
- Article 11 establishes that consultations be held
%between shippers and conferences
7
- Article 12 sets out criteria for freight rates deter­
mination,. with a prov/iso that other criteria be agreed
- Article 14 provides for notice of freight rate increases 
and reference to international mandatory conciliation, 
for disputes which may not have been resolved through 
consultation.
The code also provides (article 23-46) for the settlement 
of disputes. Basically it establishes a system of what 
is called "International Mandatory Conciliation", a « 
compromise reached between most developing countries 
desiring a system of mandatory arbitration, and most 
developed countries not wishing to have any mandatory 
dispute settlement machinery at all. (This mandatory 
conciliation will be discussed later).
The principal aim of the code, therefore,is to facilitate 
by sanction, not unilaterally by conference lines but by 
consultative.processes under international law the 
followingr
- easier access of new fleets, particularly of developing 
countries to conference services affecting their own 
and third flag liner trades
- reasonable constraint over the disposition of freight 
charges
- agreement on principles for trade participation among 
exporting, importing and third states (the so' ca'lled
8
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40:40:20 principle)
- establishment of dispute settlement machinery invoke- 
able unilaterally by either party,
1«.3 SCOPE OF THE CODE
The very title of the convention specifies a code of 
conduct for Liner Conferences. Further Resolution No,2 
on Non-Conference Lines, adopted concurrently with the 
code on 6th April 1974, restates that the conventiorl* is 
applicable to Liner Conferences and their external 
relations,.
Thus the scope of the code would broadly appear to be as 
follows:..
- It would apply to what .are now called "self-regulated 
conferences", that is. Conferences which do not serve
U.S type regulated liner trades,., since conferences
(
which are publicly regulated comprehensively, inwardly 
and outwards inconsistently with the provisions of the 
code would fall outside the scope of the code.. Some 
one-third of all conferences serve U.S liner trade 
which are regulated inwards and outwards by statute law 
and regulation,. The code would thus "prima facie", 
only apply to the remaining two thirds of the worl.d^ .s 
conference .
- It would not apply, on the basis of what had been said
g
above, to inter-governmental sponsored bi-lateral' 
agreements that are unequivocally kept outside the 
scope of the usual type of conference service.
Questions are often raised aS to whether the code applies 
to conference services only, or to what is generally 
described as the "total liner trade" of a particular 
country. By title, the code applies to liner conferences 
and this can be supported by the fact that under Partici­
pation in' Trade (Article 2), reference is made to m^ber-
ship of a Conference .........  in' trades covered by a
conference. In determining shares of trade, reference 
is made to participation in the trade carried by a 
conference; to a conference carrying the foreign trade 
between two countries; the traffic generated by the 
foreign trade carried by a conference; to trade carried 
by a conference; and to trade between, countries covered 
by conference. Reference is also made to shipping lines 
fulfilling their conference obligations. Also it is seen 
that Resolution 2 refers to non-conference shipping lines, 
and the code is considered applicable to liner conferences 
and their external relations. Non-conference lines 
competing with conference lines are also distinguished,. 
There is therefore no doubt about the fact that the code 
applies to Liner Conferences .only.
It can therefore be deduced that the following fall out­
side the scope of the Code,
ID
1, Open Conferences, i.e., Conferences serving the 
U.S trade
2, Cargoes not carried by Conference
3, Bilateral Agreements
4, Military equipment for national defence purpose, 
(Article 2, paragraph 17),
1.4 IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE CODE
Having considered the scope of the code, its principal 
aim antJ its main provisions, attention u/ill now be 
focussed on the important parts relevant to this paper. 
These include Membership, Participation in. Trade, 
Consultation Machinery, dispensation and machinery for 
settlement of disputes..
1.4.1 MEMBERSHIP
Article 1 of Chapter 2, paragraphs 1-6 cater for the 
criteria for membership of conferences. It is provided 
that any shipping line shall have the right to be a full 
member of a conference which serves the foreign trade of 
its country, provided it conforms to the entry require­
ments laid down by the conference as mentioned in 
paragraph 2 of Article 1. Also shipping lines which are 
not national lines in any trade of a conference shall have 
the right to become full members of that conference, 
subject to the provisions regarding the share of trade as 
set out in Article 2, dealing with third country shipping
11&
lines.
However as stated in paragraph 3, in considering an 
application for membership by a third country shipping 
line, irr addition to the provisions of Apticle 1, para­
graph 2 mentioned above, the following criteria would 
be taken into account:
- The existing volume of trade on the route served 
by the conference and the prospects of its growth
- The adequacy of shipping space for the existing and 
prospective volume of trade on the route served by 
the conference
- The probable effect of admission of the shipping 
line to the conference' on the efficiency and quality 
of the conference service
- The current participation of the shipping line in 
trade on the same route outside the framework of 
another conference
- The current participation of the shipping line on 
. the same route within the framework of another
conference.
The present position in' most self regulated conference 
is that membership is tightly controlled by the 
conferences. The usual reasons given for rejection 
are over tonnaging of the trade or alledged incapacity 
of the applicant line to adhere to conference schedules 
and obligations. Unrler the code, a conference refusing
12
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membership is required to give the grounds in writing and 
to take into account the views of shippers, and of 
appropriate authorities if they so request (Paragraphs 
4-6 of Article 1),
1.4.2 PffRTICIPATION IIM TRADE
This is perhaps the most important aspect of the code 
judging from the fact that cargo is the lifeblood of 
shipping activities. Invariably, almost all disputes* 
in conferences since the coming into force of the code 
has been on this topic.
Article 2 starts by saying that any shipping line admitted 
to membership of a conference shall have sailing and 
loading rights in the trade covered by the conference. 
Paragraph 3 goes on to say that for the purpose of deter­
mining the share of trade which member lines shall have 
the right to acquire, the national lines of each coming 
irrespective of the number of lines shall be regjprded as 
a group of shipping lines for that country, . It is in. 
Paragraph 4 where the cargo principle is laid out. It
•istates that when determining a share within a pool of 
individual member lines and/or groups of national shipping 
lines, the following principles regarding their rights to 
participate in the trade carried by the conference shall 
be observed, unless otherwise mutually agreed;
The group of national lines of each of two countries
the foreign trade between which is carried by the' 
conference shall have Equal Rights to participate 
in the freight and volume of traffic generated by 
their mutual foreign trade and carried by the 
conference
- Third country shipping lines, if any, shall have the 
right to acquire a Significant Part, such as 20% in 
freight and volume of traffic generated by the trade.
Provision is made for a situation where a country who€e 
trade is carried by a conference and has no national 
line. In this situation, the country's cargo shall be
r
distributed among the individual member lines participat­
ing in the trade in proportion to their respective share.
Paragraphs 6-17 deal with other aspects of, cargo sharing. 
It is stated that the provisions of Article 2, paragraphs 
1-16 inclusive concern all goods regardless of their 
origin, their destination, or the use for which they are 
intended, with the exception of military equipment for 
national defence purposes.
It is worth noting here that, the so called 40:AO:20 
principle is not a rigid quantitative formula which will 
be forcibly thrust on nations. The percentages reflected 
in the code reflect purely indicatively, those trade 
participation principles that are considered as "prima 
facie” equitable between exporting, importing and third 
flag states, in the context of permitting competition
&
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from third flag states, unless agreed otherwise. This is 
seen in the provision for periodical re-adjustment of 
shares,. (Article 2 paragraph 9),
1.4.3 CONSULTATIOM WACHINERY
Article 11 dealirrg with consultation machinery stipulates 
that there shall be consultations on matters of common 
interest between a conference, shippers' organisations, 
representatives of shippers, and where practicable shippers 
which may be designated for that purpose by the appropriate 
authority, if so desires.. It also provided that such 
consultations shall take place whenever requested by any of 
the parties mentioned above,. The following items are given 
as the matters which may be subject of consultation;
- changes in general tariff conditions and related 
regulations
- changes in’ the general level of tariff rates and rates 
of major commodities
- promotional and/or special freight rates
- imposition of, and related changes in, surcharges
- loyalty arrangements, their establishment or changes 
in their form and general condition
- changes in the tariff classification.of ports
- procedure for the supply of necessary information by 
shippers concerning the expected volume and nature of 
their cargoes, and
o 15
- presentation of cargo for shipment and the require­
ments regarding notice of cargo availability
As a principle, consultations are to begin not later 
than 30 days after receipt of the proposal for consul­
tations unless different periods of time are provided in 
the code,.
It is interesting to note that there is increasing wide­
spread interest in. the establishment of effective 
consultation machinery for shipowners and shippers to 
discuss common needs and interests,. Unilateral action, 
by conferences lead to misunderstanding,, while the taking 
of decisions at a headquarters remote from the countries 
of export and import gives the impression that the 
interest of shippers imports and national interests are 
ignored. In shipping, where both the trader and the 
shipowner depend on each other so closely, consultation, 
at all stages of decision making and on all matters is 
essentials
Since Shippers^ Councils represent most countries at 
negotiations with conferences, it will be necessary to 
make a note on them at this point.
The main purpose of a Shippers' Council is to unite 
shippers and to give them the necessary bargaining 
strength to obtain adequate and efficient services at 
the minimum cost. There is another purpose in setting up
16
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a Shippers^ Council which is also important, that of 
providing shipowners, government agencies and Port 
Authorities with a means of communicating with Shippers 
and of obtaining an authoritative shipper viewpoint.
The immediate function of a newly formed council will 
usually be to exert maximum pressure to reduce con­
ference demands for freight increases.. It must not, 
however, confine itself solely to the defensive role 
of reacting to conference demands but must be ready to 
take the initiative in collaboration with the shipping 
investigation unit (if it exists in. a country) and other 
arms of government shipping policy in assessing the 
suitability of existing services, and in- investigating 
the possibilities of more economical alternatives,.
l.A.A DISPENSATION
Paragraph 2 of Article 8 says,, in Ports where conference 
services are arranged subject to the availability of a 
specified minimum of cargo, but either the shipping line 
does not call, despite due notice by shippers, or the 
shipping line does not reply with an agreed time to the 
notice given by shippers, shippers shall automatically 
have the right, without prejudicing their loyalty status 
to use any available vessel for the carriage of their 
cargo,.
This portion of the code, in my opinion,, serves two 
useful purposes, apart from its original message. In the
17
first place, it buttresses the fact that the code is. for 
liner conferences, and secondly it answers the fears of 
most European lines who are worried about the setting up 
of freight Booking Bureau by countries in the third world. 
This second point will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3,
1,4„5 flACHINERY FOR SETTLEfflENT OF DISPUTES
A fundamental need of developing countries was to have 
provisions in the code for a viable dispute machinery to 
which either party could resort covering the whole range 
of disputes which can arise in conference operations,
Most existing conferences have no such provisions, at 
least, in regards to such matters as membership,, loyalty 
agreement, trade participation or freight.
Initially, the majority of developing countries wanted 
a system of mandatory arbitration and eventually the present 
system of mandatory conciliation put forward by the deve­
loped countries as a compromise solution was accepted, as 
the alternative would have been no provisions at all, 
which only the developed countries wanted.
Perhaps the single item in the code to which much atten­
tion is paid, is the provisions and machinery for settle­
ment of disputes. Articles 23-46 divided into three 
parts, general provisions, international mandatory^ 
conciliation, and institutional machinery discuss into 
detail this issue.
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Under International Mandatory conciliation, the 
appropriate authorities of a contracting party shall if 
they so request, participate in the conciliation^, pro­
ceedings in support of a party being a- national of that 
contracting party, or in support of a party having a 
dispute arising in the context of the foreign trade of 
that contracting party. The appropriate authority may 
alternatively act as an observer in such conciliation 
proceedings. The proceedings are to take place in a 
place unanimously agreed to by the parties or failing 
such agreement, in the place decided upon by the 
conciliators. Paragraph 2 of Article 29 demands that 
in determining the place of conciliation proceedings, 
the parties and the conciliators shall take into account, 
inter alia, countries which are closely connected with 
the dispute, bearing in mind the country of the shipping 
line concerned and, especially when the dispute is related 
to cargo, the country where the cargo originates,.
1.5 THE VIEliJS OF NATIOMS ON THE CODE
The code is a manifestation, of the world wide endeavour 
of developing countries to obtain a better share of the 
world's wealth,. Focusing on international liner shipping 
the code reflects a power struggle between a large numbsr 
of developing countries and a relatively smaller number 
of traditional maritime countries. It also reflects the 
continuing debate between those who advocate commercial 
control of international trade and those who prefer
o19
government management and regulation. The final language 
of the code represents a political compromise among the 
diverse views of many nations,.
1.5..1 THE GROUP OF 77 VIEliJ
The Group of 77, the developing countries that were the 
initiators and are among the chief proponents of the code, 
see the code as a means of eliminating discrimination in 
the ocean conference system. For them the code gra^ its 
national carriers virtually automatic entry into 
conferences and effective control over the way conferences 
operate in their trades. In effect, the code is a means 
to redistribute liner trade control to the numerically 
(but not commercially) superior developing countries,.
These countries general favour rigid application of the 
code s conference organisation mandatory cargo sharing and 
consultation procedures,.
1.5,2 THE EUROPEAN VIEW
The ten-member European' community has officially adopted 
a regulation that establishes specific conditions under 
which community member states are to accede to the code. 
In essence, the regulation accepts the provisions of the 
code for trade between the community and developing 
countries but opts for continuation of the "Status quo" 
for trade between the community and developed countries 
which accept the code, with reciprocity agreements among
o2 0
developing countries to allow cross trading in each 
others developing country trades,-
The Scandinavian countries along with the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and Greece have expressed concern that 
the code may serve as a vehicle to eliminate independent 
(non-conference) cross traders. Such elimination is a 
possibility under a rigid application of the code to ajust 
tha conference portion .of the trade rather than to all 
liner trade. Their implementing legislation is ex;oected 
to seek to prevent elimination of non—conference cross- 
traders in code trades,
1,5..3 OTHER COUNTRY VIEUPOINTS
Many of the communi-st nations of Eastern Europe, China 
and Cuba have acceded to the code with reservations that 
exempt the bilateral trade agreements under which most 
of their liner shipper is conducted. Several South 
American nations have done likewise.
There is opposition to the code among some developing 
countries,; particularly those with a strong free 
market orientation and those with well developed merchant 
marines heavily engaged in cross trading (such as Israel, 
Hong Kong and Singapore),
1.5.A UNITED STATES VIEliJ
Based on its traditional free-market principles, and on
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the numerous conflicts betuieen existing U. S laws and , the 
code^ the U.S government position has been to oppose the 
code. Wost U.S carriers agree that bilateral liner 
agreements tailored to the requirements of each trade are 
a preferable course of government action to ratification 
of the code.. It is observed that the United States 
oppose the code on several grounds, more particular 
because;
(a) Its membership provisions encourage the continua- 
tion of the closed conference system
(b) The provisions for pooling the conference cargo, 
also those providing for the allocation of a 
percentage "such as 20 percent" for the third flag 
carriers in combination with the establishment of 
equal rights for the directly trading countries,, 
i.e the supposed A0:40;20 formular would in the 
long run tend to increase costs and reduce the 
quality of service in' a trade
(c) The provisions which stipulates for 15 month rate 
stability is damaging in view of that the period 
is unreasonab-ly long
(d) To the view of the U.S Administration,, national 
lines are given, by the code, undue power since 
article 3 provides for a veto power in their favour, 
by stipulating that "a decisiorr, cannot be taken in 
respect of matters defined in a conference agree­
ment relating to the trade between two countries 
without the consent of the national shipping lines 
of those two countries"*
22
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Regarding this latter point, it could usefully be 
recalled that the U.S has a history of legislative rules^ 
which to the opinion of the U.S government were necessary 
for an adequate protection of U.S interests, against 
decision's taken by foreign based conferences. It might 
be that, the American opposition to the code derives 
less from any detailed points of different approach to 
particular problems like those referred to above and more 
from general government policy philosophy. The government 
of the United States of America has adopted and follfowed 
a de-regulating philosophy in the economy, insisting in 
that the free-enterprise system should be allowed to 
work without any distortions which the government inter­
ventions might creat. Such had been the ptiilosophy 
behind the Shipping Act of 1984 which curtailed signifi­
cantly the regulatory powers of the Federal Maritime 
Commission. (FMC),.
1.5.5 RESERWATIONS TO THE CODE
The Uienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1905) which 
is in force, describes a reservation as a "Unilateral 
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when 
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a 
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the"legal 
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their applica­
tion to the State", It further provides.that a State may 
formulate a reservation unless it is incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty. An objection by another
Contracting Party to a reservation does not preclude the 
entry into force of the treaty as between, objecting and 
reserving state unless a contrary intention' is definately 
expressed by the objecting state; tacit consent'being 
presumed from failure to object to a reservation.
0
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As seen in 1.5.4, some countries have made reservations 
to the code. Several of them wish to continue to adhere 
to bilateral agreements whilst one country has stated that 
it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 4 of* 
Article 2. The question which remains is who would decide 
on the validity of Reservations. This is a question which 
contracting parties would have to decide, as the Code is 
silent on Reservations, Let us look closely at those 
very Articles to which Reservations have been addressed, 
on I'lembership and on articles 2, 3 and 14 (5) and (9), I 
append below some of the elasticities which I believe are 
built into the texts of the various articles;
Article 2 
Paragraph 
Paragraph
Paragraph
(Trade Participation)
4: "Unless otherwise mutually agreed"
9; "Trade sharing agreements shall be 
reviewed periodically ,,,,"
19; "The application of the Article ,,,,
shall be completed within a transition
period ....  Taking into account the *
specific situation in each of the trades
concerned
24
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Article 3; (Decision-making Procedures)
These shall be based on equality of all full member 
Conference Lines; ensuring that voting rules do not 
hinder the proper work of the Conference and service of 
the trade and shall define matters on which decisions 
will be made by unanimity. Decisions cannot, however, 
be taken regarding matters defined in Conference agree­
ments relating to trade between two countries without the 
consent of national shipping lines of those two countries.
Article 14: (General Freight Rate Increases)
Paragraph B; A general freight rate increase may be 
implemented by a conference 
Paragraph 9: (a) "Conferences should institute any
general freight increase 
(b) "Unless otherwise agreed during 
consultations, minimum period of time 
between dates when one general freight 
increase becomes effective and date of 
notice for next increase ••••• Shall 
. not be less than 10 months".
In the view of some observers, the language of these texts 
contains inbuilt elasticities, or to be precise,, "reserva­
tions" - which would permit parties:
(a) to agree measures other than those primarily
addressed in the provisions; or
(b) to review the agreed provisions periodically; or
(c) to act subject to specific situation prevailing 
irr individual conference trades; or
(d) not to act so as to hinder the work of conferences 
and services; or
(e) act with discretion if they decide to act at all.
Against such background we will discuss briefly the EEC 
Reservations.. . «
EEC RESERUATIONS
The structure of the EEC Regulation'on- the Code is drawn 
such that the text of the Reservations is annexed to it.
The various individual Reservations purport to extend 
the term "national shipping line", as defined in the code 
to include, in the case of EEC member states^ any line 
established in an EEC member state; disapply article 2 on 
Trade Participation, Article 3 on Decision Waking Procedures, 
and article 14 (a) on General Freight Rate Increases, in. 
intra-EEC Conference trades and reciprocally.to intra- 
EEC-OECD trades where OCED countries may also be 
Contracting Parties to the Code, allowing however shipping 
lines of developing countries to apply for participation' 
as third country carriers in those trades,.
o
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At UNCTAD \J at Wanila (June 1979) some countries inquired
4
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ujhether the interests of developing countries in int'ra- 
OECD-EEC liner trades under the EEC Regulations mould be 
governed by the Regulation or the 1974 Code, If the 
an'suier was yes, they felt the Regulation mould then' give 
lesser protection, in intra-EEC-OECD trades to developing 
country lines and/or shippers than they mould othermise 
enjoy under the 1974 code. Socialist countries also ask 
mhether their fleet mould be excluded from intra-EEC-OECD 
trades under the Regulation, The EEC representative 
stated that developing countries' rights mould be governed 
in intra-EEC-OECD trades by the Code "Subject to the 
Regulation", and they need fear no discrimination. The 
Socialist countries mere told that they could compete in 
the same may as the other developed countries for partici­
pation in intra-EEC-OECD trades.
The question of the Reservations surfaced again at the 
Ninth Session of the UNCTAD Committee on Shipping in 
September 1980 mhen the Socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe questioned the validity of the EEC Regulation in 
terms of "universality" mhich the General Assembly in its 
Resolution 3035 (XXUII) had desired for the Code, The 
EEC spokesman replied that the Regulation mas "realistic" 
in that mhile the community mished to acknomledge 
"positively and practiJ^lly" the aspirations of develop-* 
ing countries in liner conference shippingy it had at the 
same time to maintain a commercial approach in intra- 
EEC-OECD liner trades.
<»
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Be all this as it may,, the question of reservation 
presses,- There is a sense of tremendous relief in many 
circles that the EEC,, having frozen" possible implementa­
tion of the code for some years while they debated what 
its members should do, has finally come up with what it 
itself considers to be a positive move forward,.
Mr
&
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CHAPTER TWO
2.1 LEGISLATIONS AND inPLEPIENTATION PRACTICES 
ADOPTED BY SO|V]E COUNTRIES IIM THE THIRD WORLD
Both codist and non-codist countries in the third world 
have been working on appropriate legislations and imple­
mentation schemes to help their national fleet carry a 
substantial portion of their trade. While some countries 
have managed to pass legislations to back their schemes 
some are still discussing the issues involved*.
Before we take a look at the scheme implemented in 
Ivory Coast and Ghan^ a (yet to be approved by Government) 
we will see what is being done in some countries in the 
third world,
2.1.1 BANGLADESH
The Government has instituted a legislation which reserves 
AO^ of both imports and exports to national flag vessels. 
This is not yet implemented but every effort is being 
made to get it going.
EGYPT
In Egypt, all Government cargoes plus Z 0 %  of all imports 
and exports are reserved for Egyptian flag ships. To 
support this, state cargo allocation agency gives priority
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to the state line and second preference is given to major 
Egyptian private lines.
INDIA
All Government cargoes are reserved to the national flag 
vessels. There is further legislation reserving 40% of 
all export cargoes to the national fleet,
INDONESIA
A decree of April 1982 reserves a wide interpretation of 
cargoes to Indonesian', vessels. However, despite this 
protectionist measure, Indonesia claims to carry only 10% 
of her International Seaborne trade,
PHILIPPINES
There was an original decree which reserved all government 
cargoes to national flag vessels but subsequent decree 
(January 1982) reserves 40% of all liner trade to 
Philippine vessels and further 40% to the trade partner. 
Legislation on government cargo (which accounts for 
majority share of trade) is already in force.
SRI LANKA'
There has been a recent decision that all government 
cargoes must be carried by the state shipping line. All
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export Ccjrgo is allocated by the Ceylon Freight Bureau 
since 1971, Preference is given to the State line, and 
then Freight Line (LGM),
CAWERDON
In Cameroon, all cargoes are reserved to CAFISHIP, the
state shipping line, unless trading partner has 4D;40:20
agreement dividing the whole trade. In practice, CAMSHIP
takes all best cargoes and probably a BD^ share. Non-
*€
Conference lines are completely excluded in the absence 
of bilateral agreements.
TANZANIA
Here, legislation has been passed to set up the Tanzanian 
Freight Bureau with powers to control all imports and 
exports*
2.1.2 THE IVORY COAST SYSTEM
Ivory Coast has been one of the pioneers of the full 
implementation of UNCTAD's 40:40:20 cargo sharing 
formula, and has thereby succeeded in carrying almost 
40^ of its trade with Europe since 1979,. Backed up by 
two official supervisory and administrative bodies in 
Abidjan, the Ivorian national line, SITRAM, has led 
West Africa in its development of a fleet specifically 
geared to carry its own national trade share. With
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equal relevance for breakbulk as u/ell as container 
traffic, the unique Ivorian Implementation of the code 
provides a taste of trends to come in liner shipping.
The Ivorian approach to implementing 40;AO;20 has not 
only been extremely rigid and well defined in terms of 
its aims but also very comprehensive in the control and 
monitoring of all cargo coming to and going from that 
country.. Not a single ship, container or breakbulk 
arriving in or departing from the Ivory Coast^s poiits 
can avoid the scrutiny of the Ivorian bodies created to 
control the carriage of the country's trade. Indeed, th 
implementation of the code goes beyond controlling the 
Ivory Coast's AO^ of the trade, and even comprises the 
allocation of these percentages pertaining to the fleets 
of all foreign trade partners.
’ OIC AND SISA
On December 25, 1975 the Ivory Coast Shippers'Council 
or the Office Ivorien de Chargeurs (DIC) was set up to 
oversee the full implementation of the code. The DIC 
has since become an invaluable element in the implemen­
tation of the A0;AD;20,. as well as the general maritime 
policy adopted by the Ivory Coast. Another aspect of 
Ivory Coast's bid to put the A0;A0;20 concept into 
reality on its main trade route, i.e that to Europe, is 
SISA (SITRAN International Shipping Agencies), which was
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formed in 1977, Although SISA was created primarily as 
a Liner Agency concern, its role has been enlarged by 
the Ivorian government to encompass the control and 
allocation of cargo sharing among all national lines 
participating in the trade between. Ivory Coast and 
Europe in order words to control under the supervision 
of the QIC, all loading and cargo booking to and from 
the country.
Between them, SITRAfO, SISA and QIC had by the end of «* 
1979,. all but achieved the successful implementation of 
40:40:20 on the Ivory Coast main tr.ade route (See 
Table 2,1),
An important wing of the OIC has been the Freight 
Committee, The OIC describes this division as having 
a threefold mandate upon the following lines:
- to evolve the measure and mechanism destined to 
the regulation of the maritime trade of the Ivory 
Coast
- to secure full and profitable employment for the 
national merchant fleet
- to assist the rationalisation of traffic between 
Ivory Coast and trading partners
Basically the above mandate involves the implementation 
and full adoption of the 40:40:20 cargo sharing principle
J
embodied in the Liner Conferences' code of conduct.
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TABLE 2..1
TEU HAMDLING FIGURES BY THE IVIAIN OPERATORS 
CALLING AT THE PORT OF ABIDJAN FDR 1979> 
STATISTICS SUPPLIED BY PORT OF ABIDJAN
LINE IMPORT
TEU
EXPORT TOTAL IMPORT
TONNES
EXPORT TOTAL
SNCDV 8,183 10,318 18,.5011 82,722 119,812 202,534
SITRAm° 6,157 6,711 12,868 70,498 100,011 170,509
WOERFIAN' 1,221 2,110 3,321 17,627 27,192 39 ,*^ 58
EAC 1,024 1,231 2,255 11,649 17,609 39,258
SIV0IV1AR° 1,031 823 1,854 10,952 8,978 19,930
LLOYD
TRIESTNO 2,481 3,622 6,008 26,338 33,268 59,606
SITRAM AND SIl/OMAR, THE TWO NATIONAL LINES OF 
IVORY COAST CARRIED 35.5^-
SOURCE: CONTAINERISATION INTERNATIONAL: FIAY 1980
In allocation of cargo on. a given- route SISA follows a 
basic outline of priority for cargo carriage for each line 
involved. For example on the trade between Ivory Coast 
and France, cargo priority appears in the following order:
1, Ivorian flag
2, French flag/Conference Line
3, French flag/Non-Conference line
35
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4. Cross trader/Conference Line
5. Cross trader/Non-Conference Line
Referring to this priority listing for cargo allocation 
SISA openly admits that outsiders and cross traders have 
the last priority of all (unless like EAL, the outside 
line can come to agreement for sharing its national 
cargo under governmental auspices).
All in all, the general view gained from the look at^the 
Ivory Coast's implementation of the UNCTAD code is that 
it is awe-inspiring in its comprehensive and absolute 
control of the maritime trade of the country, I'^ any would 
say it is far too tightly controlled, and that if such an 
organisation were to become common to all developing 
countries, then pure commercially-based shipping competi­
tion cannot be pursued with much success in the future.-
On the other hand, many would argue that the Ivory Coast 
has effectively rationalised * the whole trade to ensure 
regular service to shippers and full ships to shipowners, 
while at the same time giving the Ivory Coast its share 
of the trade,
Whatever the final judgement upon the situation with 
regard to the Ivory Coast's shipping policy, it can be 
said that the UNCTAD code has certainly benefited 
Ivorian shipping, and the application thereof (though
36
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both unique and controversial) is workable and proved 
that in the right circumstances, it can be enforced,
1.3 GHANA
In. October 1983, an- UNCTAD Code Implementation- Committee 
was set up in the country to draw up a scheme for the 
successful implementation of the code. The Committee 
composed of officials from Ghana Shippers' Council,
Black Star Line (The National Shipping Line),, flinis-try 
of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Trade, 
representative of Private National Lines, Ghana National 
Procurement Agency, Bank of Ghana and State Insurance 
Corporation.
The main features of the Legislation drawn up by the 
Committee (legislation yet to be approved by Government) 
are:
(a) The setting up of a Freight Booking Centre, to see 
to the strict allocation of cargo on 40:40:20 basis
(b) Cocoa, which is the number one export of the country 
because of its sensitive nature is not to be in the 
pool but to be reserved solely for the National 
fleet (provided they call on the ports where the 
cocoa shipments are destined). However an official 
of the Freight Booking Centre is to be on the Cocoa 
-Allocation Committee of the Cocoa Marketing Company
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(c) All imports financed through the Central Bank ate to 
be on FOB basis. This is to ensure the strict 
allocation of government sponsored cargo to 
national flag vessels. All exports to be on C & F 
basis
(d) A' waiver system is to be practised to enable cargo 
shipped on other vessels when national flag vessels 
are not available
(e) The Shippers^ Council (Cargo Allocation Committee) 
is to open cargo booking offices in London^ New ^^ o^ k 
and Hamburg to see to the strict allocation of all 
cargo going to Ghana on the 40:.40;20 formula
(f) Every shipper must be registered with the Ghana 
Shippers' Council through an authorised representa­
tive who will deal on his behalf, with all the 
problems relating to loading and discharging of 
maritime cargo belonging to him. The names and 
addresses of the said representativ-e must be for­
warded in writing to the Ghana Shippers' Council in 
Accra
(g) In the case of exportation, no goods will be embarked 
or loaded on a foreign ship in any port in Ghana unless 
the customs declaration in respect of the said goods is 
supported with a visa from the Ghana Shippers Council
(h) In the case of importation, shippers must rigidly 
respect the AO; 40:20 formula (40^ to national ships,
40% to their commercial partners and 20% to the other 
third party lines) and specify in the contract for
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transportation that carriage by sea shall be made in 
the first place in ships owned by Ghanaian shipowners^ 
In that case a visa must be obtained from the Ghana 
Shippers' Council prior to the loading of the cargo 
on, board foreign ships
(i) All shipping lines must forward the import/export 
manifests to the Ghana Shippers' Council not later 
than 3 days after the departure from or arrival of 
a ship in. a Ghanaian port
(j) Loading dispensation will be granted to any shipper 
whose goods cannot be carried by the National Shipping 
lines on account of insufficient space or unfavourable 
technical conditions
(k) Exports and importers may, after having obtained the 
visa from the Ghana Shippers' Council, load the 
remainder of the whole Ghanaian cargo on board liner 
Conference member ships, and outsider ships operating 
the approved freight rates
(l) In the case of goods leaving or entering ports not 
served by the National lines,, dispensation will be 
granted on loading, A dispensation which shall be
, valid for 3 months will be issued in the following 
cases:
- goods which are still not transferable by national 
ships
- goods leaving or entering ports not still covered 
or served by national ships
It is expected that,, when implemented, this scheme will 
be strict and effective like the Ivorian system so as to 
make the sharing formula a reality..
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Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the implementa­
tion of the code in- West Africa has been the lack of 
enthusiasm on the part of Nigeria to implement the code, 
Nigeria is considered the backbone, of Shipping in Wes,t 
Africa, her cargoes carried by Conferences to the sub- 
region, (See Table 2,2).. Experts feel the code will 
benefit Nigeria more than any other country in the sub- 
region, and therefore find it difficult to understand why 
serious efforts have not been made to implement the code. 
Attempts were made by the civilian government in 1981 but 
soon after the military intervention in 1983 the exercise 
was abandoned.
The main objective of the "abandoned" legislation among 
others, was "to correct the existing imbalance in the 
shipping trade and implement the entire provision of the 
UNCTAD code on the 40:40;20 sharing formular." It was 
mentioned in the document that:
(a) The Nigerian national carriers shall hav-e the ^
carrying rights of at least 40^ of the freight in 
revenue and volume of the total trade to and from 
Nigeria
40
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(b) The shipping line or group of shipping lines being 
recognised national lines of the cargo originating 
and countries which trade with Nigeria shall have 
the carrying rights of 40/? of the freight in 
revenue and volume
(c) ffll recognised third flag carriers or cross traders 
shall be entitled to the remaining 2 Q %  of the 
freight in volume and valve
(d) All importers an"d exporters whose businesses are 
registered in Nigeria shall reserve the carriage 
of their sea freight to Nigerian national carriers 
and recognised conferences for the purpose of 
allocation
(e) Nigeria's share of 40^ on each trade route will be 
allocated to recognised Nigerian national carriers 
according to a sharing scheme to be worked out by 
the Implementation Committee on the National 
Policy on Shipping
(f) In addition to the UNCTAD provision, the Nigerian 
shipping policy provides that the carriage of 40^ 
in volume and valve of the bulk cargo generated by 
Nigeria's seaborne trade shall be carried by 
recognised Nigerian carriers
(g) Another addition to the UNCTAD Code provides that 
Nigeria will enter into bilateral shipping agree­
ments with other countries for carriage of goods 
on basis that they may be at variance with that 
of UNCTAD
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TffBLE 2.2
U.K - liiEST AFRICA JOINT SERVICE (UKlt/AL) 
CARRYINGS IN FREIGHT TONNES (OOO^S)
1981 1982 1983
Nigeria Cargo 1252.5 '892*3 247.4
Non Nigeria Cargo 215.9 156.2 59.0
Overall 1468.4 1048.5 306.4
Nigeria %  of Overall 85% 85% 81%
SOURCE: UKWAL STATISTICS 1983
In order to ensure the effective implementation of this 
policy, an Implementation Committee was to be set up by 
the Federal Government to advise the Minister of 
Transport in the following areas of shipping activities:
(a) The implementation of the provisions of the UNCTAD 
Code within the framework of International Shipping 
Industry, in such a manner as to ensure effective 
carriage of Nigerian’s sea borne trade in volume and 
value by recognised Nigerian carriers
(b) All aspects of commercial shipping especially those 
relating to cargo sharing, ship procurement, freight 
rates etc.
(c) Monitoring allocation of cargo among the indegenous 
and foreign ships operating within Nigerian* 
territorial waters
O A2
(d) Activities of shipping conferences
(e) Operation of clearing and forwarding agents, 
shipping agents, chandlers etc. in areas 
where they affect the implementation.of this 
policy.
Looking at this Legislation, one can judge that had it 
been implemented, it would have gone a long way to 
enhance the balance of payment position of the country. 
Nigeria spends billions of Naira on shipments on
•tf
foreign lines, and if they could carry a larger propor­
tion of their own trade, there would be savings. In 
the U.K - West Africa Conference, Nigeria cargo accounts 
for of the overall trade (table 2,2) yet the bulk of
the cargo goes to U.K flag ships (table 3,2), The situa­
tion is even worse in the Continent - West Africa 
Conference where no pooling arrangements exist,
2,1.5
Despite the fact that the Ivory Coast, Ghana and other 
West African countries hope to make their freight booking 
centres work in their favour, it has come under severe 
criticism from European Lines, who feel that they are 
going to be cut off in the West African trade, which they 
have dominated for years. One does not, however under­
stand the fears of the European Lines because in the 
first place. Article 47 of the code categorically states
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"Each contracting party shall take such legislative or 
other measures as may be necessary to implement the 
present convention”. Secondly, wherever there is the 
freight booking system there exist a waiver system 
which sort of allocate cargo to other lines when 
national flag vessels are not available. Normally, 
when the 40^ target is achieved^ the waiver system is 
supposed to work effectively..
It should be concluded that, the desire of most develop
»c
ing countries to set up freight Bureau is just an 
attempt to consolidate their 40^ of their trade and 
not an attempt to control the whole trade.
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CHAPTER THREE
3.1 GENERAL OUERUIEUI OF LINER SHIPPING IN liJEST AFRICA
3.1.1 CONFERENCES SERUIIMG THE UJEST AFRICAN REGIOM
As many as nine liner conferences operate between West 
Africa and Europe^ Asia and America, the major ones being 
the Continent - West Africa Conference with its Head­
quarters in Hamburg (Northern Section) and Paris .« 
(Southern Section), and having over twenty members;
United Kingdom - West Africa Lines Service with its 
Headquarters in London with a membership of eight; and 
Mediterranean Europe - West Africa Conference with 
Headquarters in Marseilles and membership of sixteen.
(See table 3.1 for a full list of conferences serving 
West Africa).
3.1.2 THE UNITED KINGDOM - WEST AFRICA JOINT SERVICE (UKWAL)
UKWAL with its Headquarters in Liverpool has a membership 
of eight shipping lines, three from U.K, one from 
Continent and four from West Africa. (Table 3,2). UKWAL 
is the only Conference operating to West Africa which 
practices the pooling of cargo and revenue. The big 
lines (by percentage cargo share) are the Elder Dempster 
Line (U.K) and Nigeria National Shipping Line (Nigeria). 
Percentage share of each line is determined by the
•>
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contribution of the Line's country's cargo in the pool, 
that is why we see that Nigeria which contributes about 
8 5 %  of the whole pool cargo gets 31,.5^  for her National 
line, NNSL. Presently the trade is sort of shared on 
bilateral basis, with the UK Lines getting almost 50%, 
This situation is bound to change with the coming into 
force of the UNCTAD Code, and the steps being taken by 
West African lines will be discussed in the next chapter,.
TABLE 3,1
CONFERENCES SERVING WEST AFRICA
Conference HeadOffice
No. of 
flembers 
from Deve­
loping 
countries
No. of 
Members 
from Deve­
loping, 
countries
1, Continent-West 
Africa Conference
Northern Section 
Southern Section
Hamburg
Paris 8 19
2. U,K-West Africa 
Service Liverpool 4 4
3. fled. Europe-West 
Africa Conference Plarseilles 7 g
4, America-West
Africa Conference New York 3 10
5. West Africa-South 
Africa Conference Durban. — 8
B, West Africa-Far 
East Conference
Angola/Cameroon
Range Tokyo 1 7
7, West Africa-Far 
East Conference
Nigeria/Senegal
Range Tokyo 3 6
Antwerp 2 6
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8, Associated Central- 
West Africa Lines
9, US Great Lakes St.- Lawrence River Ports- 
West Africa Agreement New York 2 3
SOURCE: CRDNER'S WORLD DIRECTORY:- CONFERENCES (1982)
TABLE 3.2
PIEf^ lBERSHIP OF UKWAL AND PERCENTAGE SHARE 
OF T'lEnBERS IN CARGO POOL (AS AT 31/11/84)
Line Country %  Share
1, Elder Dempster/Guinea Gulf U.K 35.464
2, Palm Line U.K 14.495
3. Nigeria National Shipping 
Line Nigeria 31.501
4. Black Star Line Ghana 7.723
5. c.n.z Zaire 1.159
6. SITRAF! Ivory Coast 3.460
7, Hoegh Norway 6.198
SOURCE: UKWAL SECRETARIAT, LIVERPOOL
3.1.3 CONTINENT WEST AFRICA CONFERENCE (COWAC)
Cowac is divided into two sections, the Northern and 
Southern Section. The Northern Section covers- trade from 
the North Cape/Belgium range and is based in Hamburg and 
operates a Deutsch Mark tariff. The Southern Section
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includes ports in the Dunkirk/Bayonne range, and is based 
in Paris and has a French Franc tariff. This division can 
be viewed as a reflection of Europe's historical links 
with West Africa and particularly the former colonial 
structure, French tariff is geared particularly to the 
so-called Francophone territories,
Cowac is looked at by most shipping lines as a "loose” 
conference where even tariff is not strictly adhered to, 
with a lot of "under cutting" of freight rates. This is 
probably due to the size of the conference. Meetings are 
not held on regular basis. For instance since 1980 the 
first time a Principals' Meeting was held was 1983 in' 
Hamburg, unlike in the UKWAL where Principals' Meetings 
are held almost every quarter (March, June, September, 
December ).
TABLE 3.3
MEMBERSHIP OF COWAC
Line
Cameroon* Shipping Lines
Companie Maritime des 
Chargeurs Reunis
Country
Cameroon
F ranee
Companie Beninoise de 
Navigation
Companie Maritime Beige
Benin
Belgium
Companie de Navigation Denis F reres F ranee
Woerman Line West Germany
East Asiatic Company Denmark
Estonian Shipping Company U.S.S.R
Line
9
Country
U.K
U.K
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Elder Dempster Lines 
Guinea Gulf Line
Hoegh Lines Norway
Nedlloyd B,\J Holland
Palm Line U.K
Polish Ocean Lines Poland
SITRAfl Ivory Coast
SDTDNAM Togo
SNTM Gabon
Delmas Uieljeux F ranee
Cosenam Senegal -
Nigeria National Shipping 
Line Nigeria
Black Star Line Ghana
Scandinavia West Africa Line Sweden '
V.E.B Deutfracht Seereederci East Germany
SOURCE; COWAC AGREEHENT
3.2 NIGERIA AND LINER LINKS WITH WEST AFRICA
As mentioned elsewhere, Nigeria is a vital generator of 
business for liner shipping companies operating to West 
Africa, even for those French operators who traditionally 
have concentrated on former colonial territories, the 
so called Francophone countries, Nigeria traditionally 
accounts for some 60^ of cargoes carried from the 
Hamburg/Antwerp range in the ships of Cowac (Northern
section). Even in the Southern section, Nigeria has 
represented about a third of total business.
Trading links with Nigeria since 1982/83 have been 
dominated by the upheavals in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
problems stem principally from oil price movements. 
Recession in the industrialised world coupled with 
changes on the supply side have dramatically reduced 
demand for OPEC crude at official price levels. The 
result has been plummeting revenues. At the start of 
1981, Nigeria was producing something like 2 million 
barrels of oil a day. By the middle of the year, output 
has dropped to about 700,000)barrels a day. At the end 
of the year Nigeria was producing at around 800,000 
barrels a day. Central Bank foreign reserves were 
estimated to be around ^1 billion - enough to cover only 
a month's imports and arrears were continuing to mount 
towards international crisis levels.
These developments have had their effects in the liner 
shipping business. UKUJAL for example reckons that trade 
was running at around 60% below the 1981 level ever since. 
Similar problems prevail in the Continental trades. As 
mentioned, Nigeria accounts for some 60% of Cowac Northern 
Section Cargoes and about 85% of UKlilAL cargoes.
The impact of the Nigerian difficulties in shipping links 
was jerky. The initial crunch came in March 1982 when the 
country's central bank announced a clampdown by embargoing
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letters of credit and suspending the form” system 
governing imports and the release of foreign exchange. 
Accompanying the documentary moves was a list of import 
restrictions designed to control trade in goods manufac­
tured by Nigeria. Given the vagaries of the trade and 
the tendency of the Nigerian government to impose curbs 
without any warning, it is not surprising that liner links 
were, and are, in a state of tumoil. Each shipping 
company has its own list of horror stories to tell.
Shipping companies with Nigerian involvement have reacted 
to the market conditions in two basic ways. One course of 
action has been to try to maintain schedules, carrying on 
basically as though nothing had happened. The alternative 
response has been to tailor the sailing schedule and 
service frequency to the level of demand. This has caused 
some bunching, particularly at deadline times, followed 
by longer periods of greatly reduced activity,. Operators 
adopting the latter course argue that they are meeting 
the needs of the market in that development has to be 
flexible, given the trading conditions.
Efforts have also been made to bring the tonrrage employed 
into line with the reduced trade flows. Companies owning 
ships have been laying vessels up or seeking to switch 
them to other trades via the charter market. Charter 
specialists have been reducing their exposure by tonnage 
for shorter periods,.
British trade links with West Africa, of course, are
dominated by Nigeria, During this period, UKU/AL was 
affected by the economic disruptions in' the country to 
a considerable extent.* At the start of the period, 10 
or 11 vessels were leaving U.K each month. This has 
dropped to 5 or 6, and is still falling.. UKWAL runs its 
ships on three basic rotations, two of which serve Lagos/ 
Apapa,. The reduction in the number of sailings has been 
accompanied by an increase in the range of discharge ports 
visited. Thus since 1982, UKWAL has ceased to schedule 
ships directly through to Lagos/Apapa and instead, had 
grafted on- calls before the Nigerian capital* An increase 
in the number of U.K ports served on individual voyages is 
being noted,
3.3 OUTSIDER ACTIVITIES IN UlEST AFRICA'
In spite of the problems of the Nigerian market, a number 
of "outsider” lines (Lines not belonging to conferences) 
have been operating and their number increasing. These 
include Afea Star Line, which is offering a monthly 
container/conventional service from the North Continent 
and U,K. Afea is a substantial Far Eastern Shipowner irr 
its own. right,.
A' second contender is Hayling Sea Line, again with far 
Eastern connections. The Hamburg/Antwerp range plus 
Felixstowe (UK) are ports served using chartered vessels 
in the 15000 DliJT class.
<»
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OT Africa Line (DIAL) operates a classic Ro-Ro service 
from North continent, France, and the U.K, Catering for 
the full cargo spectrum, the non-conference line is a 
joint venture involving the Antrak Group, Cross Marine 
Services, and Stena Line, North European calls include 
Felixstowe, Rotterdam, Zeebrugee, Hamburg and Le Havre,
In West Africa, OTAL vessels proceed directly to Lagos/ 
Apapa, followed by Tema, Lome, Cotonou, Douala and li/arri.
Another Ro-Ro operator (non-conference) in. the market is 
Matina Lines, Formerly run by the Labaid group out of 
Rotterdam Matina specialises in rolling cargoes - in cars, 
vans, trucks and trailers, Harwich, Rotterdam and Antwerp 
are served by this non-conference operator. Ports served 
in West Africa are Lagos/Apapa, Tema, Douala and Cotonou 
with other destinations subject to inducement,
Siosa-Grimaldi also offers a non-conference service out of 
the U,K and Antwerp to Lagos/Apapa,. Vessels usually 
proceed from Southampton to Lagos/Apapa via Tema, Transit 
times for the last named port are between 13-18 days,
Medafrica Line offers a container only link supported by 
a multi-purpose operation. Calls are made at Hamburg, 
Rotterdam, Antwerp, Dunkirk, Liverpool, Felixstowe and 
Ipswich, Lagos/Apapa is the principal destination.
The established non-conference carrier Europe Africa Line 
(EAL) based in Bremen calls at Lagos/Apapa as a port of
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a routeing which includes Dakar, Abidjan, Lome, Warri and 
Douala, Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam, Antwerp and Rouen 
are the normal loading ports, *
Another major non-conference operator is Golden Liberty 
Line, whose operation is based on the cargo generated by 
the Nigerian/Indian trading group' which controls it. Three 
ships in the 7500 DliJT/226 TEU class are employed one owned 
and two chartered, GLL serves Antwerp, Harwich and Hamburg, 
In Nigeria the service is concentrated on Lagos/Apapa al- 
though through-transport is available to Kano, and Kaduna 
for container traffic,
3,4 CO-OPERATION AKiONG LINES OPERATING TO liJEST AFRICA
With the exception of Ghana^s Black Star Line and Ivory 
Coast's SITRAl'l, all West Africa Shipping lines have some 
sort of relationship with one European Line or the other,
Camship (Cameroon) is 3 owned by a West German Company 
so there is the German influence as far as management is 
concerned. Comapnie Maritime Zairoise (CMZ) of Zaire is 
managed by Companie Maritime Belgoise (CMB) of Belgium 
and are even represented at Conference Meetings by CMB 
officials. Senegal's COSENAM (yet to own a ship) is 
controlled by Delmas Uieljeux of France, Cobenam of 
Benin is controlled by Societfe Navale de I'Ouest (SNO) of
France, SOTONAM of Togo are controlled by-Woerman Line 
of West Germany. Infact all SOTONAM vessels are manned
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by West Germans (except ratings), SOWOTRAM of Gabon is 
also in the hands of Delmas Uieljeux while Nigeria Green 
Lines is aligned to Woerman Line.
Nigeria National Shipping Lines (NNSL) operates a 
"conference within a conferenca" with Palm Line, Elder 
Dempster and Hoegh Lines. This group is know as the 
NEPH group. They operate both in the COWAC and in the 
UKWAL and on most occasions take common stand at 
Conference meetings.
On the other side of the trade, CflB (Belgium^^ Nedlloyd 
(Holland), Delmas Vieljeux (France), Denin Freres (France) 
and Woerman Line (West Germany) operate a joint service 
within COWAC and other trades,-
3.5 CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN’ CONFERENCES AND SHIPPERS
The growth of awareness of the need for regular consulta­
tions between shipper and shipowner at representative 
level is of comparatively recent origin and, with isolated 
exceptions, no sustained attempt seems.to have been made 
by either party to join discussions at an adequate level 
of representation until 1983 when a meeting of Flinisters 
of Western European Governments, predominantly the tradi­
tional maritime countries, projected the topic into the 
forum of international debate, albeit initially centred 
on Europe and focussed upon the structure and practices 
of European based shipping conferences and the collective
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needs of the shippers they serve. Prior to this in the 
West Africa trade and elsewherej there hady of course 
existed for many years innumerable trade arrangements 
satisfactory to both parties so that apart from the 
constant, often almost day to day, contact between an 
individual shipowner and his regular customers which 
was and continues to be essential if'business is to be 
conducted to the mutual advantage, there existed, and 
obviously must exist, methods of communication and con­
sultation between shipowners represented jointly by 
their conferences and trade associations with sectional 
interests in a particular area of the trade served,.
What was lacking was the larger forum, or more specifically 
the will and organisation to bring it into existence, for 
the ventilation of problems, the examination of grievances 
and the framing of policy agreements on a national scale, 
ultimately on'international scale. Whilst shipowners are 
sometimes blamed for this deficiency,, which a decade later 
and viewed in the present climate of opinion does seem 
extraordinary, it is only fair to observe that any dialogue 
requires two parties and it is surjely the responsibility of 
each party to look to their own arrangements for representa­
tion* and to provide adequate mandate for those nominated or 
selected for the task. Shipowners had long since provided 
themselves with the means of representation and joint 
decision in the form of their liner conferences which had 
proven effective and beneficial for the regulation of their 
own affairs but, whilst recognising the need for consultation
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with their customers at a comparable representational 
level of authority and influence, conferences could no 
more consult in the then prevailing vacuum than could 
they initiate a counter balancing movement on the part 
of shippers and trade associations collectively,
3..5.1 THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF CENTRAL 
AND W E S T  AFRICAN STATES
This body was set up in 1975 by 25 member countries from
West and Central Africa with the following objectiv,ps;
(1) To bring together all the 25 nations constituting 
the West and Central Africa region and to formu­
late common maritime policies to safeguard their • 
interests
(2) Through resolutions, to press for
(a) The ratification and the taking of measures 
for safeguarding the Code of Conduct for 
Liner conferences
(b) The formation of National Shippers^ Councils 
and the joint negotiation of freight rates 
through the Freight Negotiating Committee
’ (c) Integration of the Ports Management
Association of West/Central Africa in the 
structure of the Ministerial Conference 
(d) Co-operation agreements between national 
shipping lines/companies of member states
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(e) Harmonisation of maritime laws and bilateral 
and multilateral agreements of member states
(f) Improvement of action undertaken in favour of 
landlocked countries.
There are three main organs of the Ministerial Conference, 
namely:
- The Regional Negotiating Committee
- Ports Management Association of West/Central Afric^
- Association of National Shipping Lines
Of the three bodies, it is only the Regional Negotiating 
Committee which has been functioning effectively, although 
of late (since 1983) attempts are being made to make the 
Association of National Shipping Lines a reality, with 
series of meetings taking place, mainly on the initiative 
of Mr, Ahibe, the General Manager of SITRAM, who is also 
the Chairman' of the Continent-West Africa Conference 
(COWAC), Northern- section. One of the objectives of the 
Association is to take a common stand at Conference Dleetings 
and also to forster cordial relations between the National 
Lines of the region,
3.5.2 THE REGIONAL NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE
This body is commonly known as the African Negotiating 
Committee (ANC) and perhaps it can be said that the 
continued existence of the Ministerial Conference has been
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because of the hard work of this committee, which has 
since its inception been negotiating freight rates With 
the various conferences operating to West and Central 
Africa on behalf of Governments of the 25 member 
countries, and also shippers in these countries. Apart 
from general freight rates, the Committee negotiates the 
following on behalf of shippers;
“ Port congestion surcharges
- Port additionals (imposed on ports by conferences 
for alledged unproductivity)
- Availability of Conference tariffs.and regulations
- Introduction of and alterations in shippers’^ 
contracts and agreements
- Bill of Lading conditions in respect of containers
- Route diversions
- flinimum advance notice of increases in freight rates
- r^ethods of charge for heavy and long lifts
- Freight rate adjusting methods following currency 
devaluations or revaluations
- Special freight rates for the various Marketing 
Boards in the region, for instance the Ghana Cocoa 
Marketing Board, Nigeria Palm Board and Sierra Leone 
Produce Board.
Praises can be showered on the Negotiating Committee in 
the sense that for the past three years, freight rate 
increases in the sub region has been minimal compared 
to the era before they started working. Currently, they
hav/e managed to freeze any freight increase on the 
America-West Africa trade for some time.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE POSITION OF GHANA'S LINER SHIPPING
Although this paper is devoted to the whole West 
African sub-region's liner shipping, I am devoting 
this chapter to Ghana's liner shipping, in order to 
isolate Ghana's 'position, as far as the code of 
conduct is concerned and attempt to find out whether 
the code will be beneficial to Ghana's liner shipping,
Mr
especially to her National Line, Black Star Line,
A.l
Ghana's Liner shipping scene is dominated by the State 
Shipping Corporation, Black Star Line to some extent, 
although foreign lines play an important role in the 
foreign trade of the State, and a number of smaller 
Ghanaian liner companies have fairly recently also 
entered the scene, mainly on the Continent and United 
Kingdom to West Africa route. The smaller Ghanaian 
liner companies are Remco Lines, Kadas Lines and Unity 
Star Line (yet to acquire a vessel of its own).
The bulk of Ghana's foreign trade is moved through the
Tema port, a modest and shrinking share passing through
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the Port of Takoradi,
The bulk of the trade between Ghana and the United 
Kingdom, North Continent, the Mediterranean and 
USA is organised in conferences with Ghana's largest 
National Line, Black Star Line (BSL) being a member 
of all these conferences. The other three national 
lines operate as outsiders,.
4.1.1 GHANA'S TRADE UITH NORTH CONTINENT
This trade is organised through the Continent - West 
Africa Conference (COWAC), with BSL as a member. Black 
Star Line's percentage share in this trade (Antwerp- 
Hamburg range to West Africa) averages about 2 %  while 
in the trade to Ghana, the Line carries about 38^
(see table 4.1), The Line's share in the total trade 
is however small, due to the fact that it operates 
mainly in the Antwerp-Hamburg range, not calling at 
Scandinavian ports and also Baltic ports, A look at 
table 4,2 will show that apart from the Antwerp-Hamburg 
range, cargoes move from Scandinavia (carried mainly by 
E.A.C, Line) and the Baltic (carried by the Eastern bloc 
lines) to Ghana, A substantial amount of cargoes moving 
between. French ports and Ghana are carried on Black 
Star Line vessels,.
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TABLE 4,.I
COliiAC SOUTHBOUND (AiMTUERP HAFIBURG RANGE - 
hJEST AFRICA) (IN FREIGHT TONNES)
1979
1980
1981
1982
1/1983( '2)
BSL
BSL
BSL
BSL
BSL
A
TOTAL CDUJAC
2,026,-050
93,860
2,407,000
34,065
2,742,630
51,985 (1.9^) 
2,325,340
23,070 (1.0%) 
847,660
8,470 (1,0%)
B
TO GHANA
112,010 ( 5.-5%) 
65,215 (58.2 ) 
88,665 ( 3.7 ) 
24,37® (27.5 ) 
113,070 ( 4.1 ) 
35,160 (31.1 ) 
47,750 ( 2.1 ) 
18,475 (38.7 ) 
23,965 ( 2.8 ) 
8,470 (35.3 )
SOURCE; COUAC STATISTICS 1979-83 (COIMF. SECRETARIAT)
In the export shipments, on paper, about 80% of Ghana's 
cocoa are to go on BSL vessels but in practice this is 
not the case. The sole exporter of cocoa, Ghana Cocoa 
Marketing Company is by legislation, to use Black Star 
Line vessels for ports in Europe covered by the Line 
but due to reasons which cannot be discused in this 
paper, less than 40% of the cocoa goes on Black Star 
Line vessels,- Table 4,3 shows the trend from 1981-1983,
TABLE A.3
GHAIMA-NDRTH CONTINENT AND BALTIC TRADE (IN TONNES)
COCOA PRODUCTS LOGS TIMBER OTHERS TOTAL
1981 COU/AC 86,775 7,165 27,655 8,810 14,530 144,935
BSL 25,155(29^) 3,620(50%) 685(2%) - - 29,460(20%)
1982 COliJAC 107,730 20,500 21,195 8,965 7,025 165,415
BSL 42,100(39%) 1,020(5%) - - 50 43,170(26%)
1983( V2) COWAC 32,320 670 5,570 2,165 1,200 41., 925
BSL 8,000(25%) 190(28%) - — . 8,190(20%)
SOURCE: ANNUAL STATISTICS, BLACK STAR LINE,. HAMBURG
TABLE A.2
COWAC SOUTHBOUND TO GHANA
SCANDINAVIA^^^ (2)BALTIC^ ' ANTWERP/HArOBURG TOTAL FRANCE
1979 5425WT/6975FT 1555WT/29A5FT 58,255WT/112010FT B22501JJT/121925FT BB30U1T/7925FT
1980 3910WT/63B5FT 2600lliT/3770FT 48,090lijT/ 88605FT 54B00UJT/98795FT 14970WT/17470FT
1981 3315UJT/A1A5FT 5150UJT/15090 48,180UJT/113070FT 57145WT/132305FT 4250WT/5735FT
1982 1735U)T/2805FT 34l5UiT/75Q5FT 22,715UJT/47750FT 278B5UiT/580BOFT B82UiT/l304FT
%
1/1983( '2) 1086UJT/1390FT 4660UJT/11170FT..11565UJT/23965FT 17300WT/3B52FT 43UiT/3B525FT
1, Carried mainly by EAC Line
2. Carried by Eastern Bloc Lines
SOURCE: ANNUAL STATISTICS - BLACK STAR LINE REPRESENTATIVES OFFICE, HAMBURG
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4.1.2 GHAI\iA-U,K TRADE
This trade is conducted through the United Kingdom- 
West Africa Lines Conference (UKWAL) of which Black 
Star Line is a founding member. In this conference, 
there exist a Pooling Arrangement. Each member-line 
has a percentage share in the pool, which is revised 
from time to time. The share of individual lines is 
determined by the contribution of the member linens* 
country's trade in the pool., As already mentioned in 
previous chapters, this trade is basically, a U.K- 
Nigeria affair, as about 85^ of the cargoes are 
destined for Nigerian ports. Ghana^s contribution, 
despite its volume (7.5^ in 1984) compared to that of 
Nigeria is the second in the pool. (See table 4.4), 
Black Star Line's percentage share in the pool, in the 
years preceeding the coming into force of the UNCTAD 
code was 7.7^. It used to be 9.9^ in 1976. In nay 
1985, at a Principals' Meeting held in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, shares of Member Lines were reviewed to be in 
line with the UNCTAD's sharing formula of 40:.40;20,
Black Star Line's share was slashed to 4.29%, a result 
of the adherence to the code's cargo sharing principles,
4.1.3 NON-CONFERENCE ACTIUITIES
Like in the Nigerian Liner trade, Ghana's liner trade is
^.4 UK-.Ii;EST AFRICA FREIGHT TONNAGE 1982-198^
SOUTHBOUND
1982 1983 1984
Senegal 3,525 4,242 3,217
Gambia 11,907 11,902 11,169
Sierra Leone 20,990 14,451 20,052
Guinea mm - -
Liberia • 11,165 8,735 7,338
Ivory Coast 14,310 10,650 14,786
Ghana 44,307 40,818 44,332
Togo 8,148 5,748 7,407
Benin 10,010 5,995 2,236
Nigeria 889,536 538,976 448,363
Cameroon- 23,775 14,215 15,879
Equitorial Guinea - - -
Gabon; 144 2,686 2,352
Republic of Congo 1,966 1,709 1,069
Zaire 8,289 3,596 -
Angola - — 766
1,048,072 663,723 578,966
SOURCE; UKWAL SECRETARIAT, LIVERPOOL
NORTHBOUND
TOTAL
10,984
34,978
55,493
27,238
39,746
129,457
21,303
18,241
1,876,875
53,869
5,182
4,744
11,885
______766
2,290,761
1982 1983
2,939 4,240
30 149
3,958 4,563
829 394
95,124 88,663
67,555 44,336
243 22
908 -
71,513 83,556
11,948 11,620
6,740
%
4,747
3,778 3,387
~ -
265,565 245,677
1984 TOTAL
2,747 9,926
12 191
6,954 15,475
474 1,697
46,666 230,453
43,700 155,591
- 265
25 933
61,616 216,685
4,490 28,058
3,586 15,073
- 7,165
-- >•
170,270 681,612
0
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to some extent, characterised by non-conference liner 
activities. This is mainly due to the fact that Black 
Star Line limits its liner activities to U,K Ports 
(Liverpool, London, Avonmbuth, Dublin) and ports within 
the Antwerp-Hamburg range in the North Continent, plus 
some French ports. In this situation, all cargoes 
originating from other ports, such as the Far East, 
America and Mediterranean move on non-conference vessels, 
(BSL ceased operating to the USA and Mediterranean from 
1980). Non-conference operators active in Ghana include;
(1) 0,T,. Africa Line
(2) Gulf Maritime
(3) Remco Line
(а) A’fea Line
(5) Gold Star Line
(б) Zim Line
The last three lines, Afea, Gold Star and Zim lines 
operate mainly from the Far East while the others load 
from other U.K and continental ports not served by Black 
Star Line»
A»1«A THE CODECS EFFECTS ON BSL LINER OPERATIONS
One of the main objectives of the code is to help lines 
from developing countries participate in the carriage of
their own external trade. However, the benefits to be
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realised out of this new order varies from country to 
country. For instance, let us take a look at some 
category of lines and how their benefits vary. Let us 
group shipping lines in these three categories:
(a) Line from developing countries with a big volume 
of trade with insufficient tonnage, (Nigeria is 
an example of such a country, uiith her major 
National line, Nigeria National Shipping Line 
falling into this group)
(b) Lines from countries with vessels just sufficient 
to carry the country's external trade,. (The 
Ivory Coast and her National line, SITRAfO, fall 
in this group)
(c) Lines from countries with surplus tonnage; i,-e 
their volume of trade is so low that her own 
vessels have to find business elsewhere.
Black Star Line obviously falls within the third group, 
as from available statistics, it is evident that Ghana's 
foreign trade has been on a very low side for some years 
now. For instance, Ghana's contribution (imports) to the 
UKWAL cargo pool has decreased substantially -from 173,198 
tonnes in 1974 to 44,332 tonnes in 1984, a decrease of 74% 
(table 4..5)*
In 1974, BSL had 16 (sixteen) general breakbulk vessels 
of about 10,800 DWT each. Around the same period 4 (four) 
16,001] DliiT multi-purpose vessels with a 500 TEU carrying
9 72
TABLE 4.5
GHANA'S CONTRIBUTION TO UKWAL POOL
1974-1984 (IN TONNES)
GHANA TOTAL PERCENTAGE
1974 173,198 1,417,,996 12.2
1975 144,198 1,680,464 CD • CD
1976 181,131 1,842,713 CO « CO
1977 184,907 2,153,286 CD . CD
1978 153,426 1,658,002 9.3
1979 90,390 1,052,043 8,6
1980 102,258 1,510,249 6.8
1981 78,658 1,514,476 5.2
1982 44,307 1,048,072 4.2
1983° 40,818 663,723 6.1
1984° 44,332 578,966 7.6
o
Decrease in total attributed to drastic austerity
measures taken by government of Nigeria from 1983
to control imports, in the wake of decreasing oil
revenues.
SOURCE; UKWAL STATISTICS 1974-1984 (CONF. SECRETARIAT)
capacity were ordered from the Hyondai Shipyard, South Korea 
In 1980, the line had 20 (twenty) vessels, but today the 
situation is very different. Only the four multi-purpose 
vessels and three of the general breakbulk vessels are
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trading today, with the multi-purpose vessels employed 
mainly in the open-market leaving the three old ones to 
do the liner service. As and when the line gets a slot 
in the UKWAL pool, one of the multi-purpose vessels is 
withdrawn from charter to do the liner run. The rest of 
the vessels were sold between 1981 and 1984, This un­
fortunate situation has been the direct result of Ghana^s 
decreasing foreign trade,
Black Star Line was formed in 1957, with a foresight to 
carry the trade of all West African countries. This was 
exactly what happened from 1957 to the late 1970's when 
other countries in' the region started forming their own 
shipping lines. As the first indegenous line in Africa,
South of the Sahara desert, BSL dominated the liner scene 
in West Africa with regular sailings between West Africa 
and U.K Continental Europe,. USA/Canada and the Mediterranean, 
Her vessels had full employment, each performing on the 
av.erage about 5 (five) sailings inr a year between West Africa 
and the ports mentioned. At times, additional tonnage were 
chartered to supplement the lines fleet.
The coming into force of the Liner Code of Conduct has 
compounded the problems of Black Star Line, instead of 
being beneficial to the Line. For instance in the UKWAL 
Conference, as mentioned earlier, the share of the line 
before the code came into force was 7.7^ but from May 1985 
her share has been slashed to 4.2^, after basing the 
sharing on the UNCTAD formula. So long as the Conference
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uses a member lines country's contribution in the trade 
to determine shares, the only way BSL's share laill 
increase will be Ghana's contribution in the pool 
increasing, that is, improuement in her foreigrr trade. 
Currently 40^ of the country's contribution to the pool 
comes to only (1984 figures).
In Couac, the pooling system does not exist, but the 
situation is not different from that in UKUJAL as far as 
BSL's participation is concerned. Almost all West Africa 
countries whose trade are covered by the conference now 
have their national fleet, and as such efforts are being 
made by their "appropriate authorities" to commandeer 40^ 
of their trade to their ships. Invariably, in the 
Francophone West African countries notably. Ivory Coast, 
Cameroon and Gabon, it is becoming increasingly impossible 
for third flag lines to participate in their trade, as they 
have the "a priori" control of cargo which by legislation, 
sees to it that all government cargoes go to their National 
fleet. Apparently, all these countries have bilateral 
trade agreements with France, which makes it possible for 
their trade to be carried on French vessels and on their 
vessels. As a result, for some time now, BSL vessels 
from the continental ports have to be contended with the 
little cargo going to Ghana, and at times few parcels for 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The vessels are curren'tly 
operating from the Continent at about 50% capacity.
Whilst Ghana's imports are going to be the same as they
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are now for at least the next few years, a way of keeping 
the national fleet in business in the wake of problems 
being faced as a consequence of the introduction of the 
code will be to ensure through legislation, that all 
government cargoes which do not go on’ Conference lines 
and are as such outside the scope of the code are carried 
on national vessels,.
A substantial amount of bulk wheat, maize, rice, machinery 
and other import licence covered cargoes are imported into 
the country by the Ghana National Procurement AgencyiJ'
(GNPA), Because the importation are on CIF basis, the 
suppliers nominate their own vessels. As stated earlier 
on, the code does not cover cargoes not carried by 
conference. These GNPA imports are carried outside the 
conferences and as such nothing stops the Government, if 
it so desires, to ensure that all such imports are on 
FOB basis,. This will enable her national line have some­
thing to carry outside her conference operations.
Now, should one ask "why should Ghana be the first country 
in the world to ratify the code when it appears that her 
liner shipping, at its present state, will not benefit from 
the new order", what should be the answer be?
When examining the feasibility and desirability of Ghana's 
adherence to the code, a step which may appear not to be 
beneficial to the country's liner shipping, at least at her 
present state, several aspects must be scrutinized. Probably
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the best answer to this question is that Ghana is not in 
a position of being able to exercise superior economic 
power over any of its trading partners, as the EEC or 
COMECON countries can do with theirs. In this light, the 
only thing to do is to follow the bandwagon and adhere to 
the provisions of the code and just hope that her economy 
picks up,. When this happens, her national line will reap 
the benefits of the code.
Apart from the recommendations given in the previous page, 
other steps could be taken to boost Ghana s contribution 
in the UKWAL pool and also get more cargo for national 
vessels from the continent.
In the U.K trade, a lot of "Outsiders” carry Ghana's 
trade as earlier stated. The Ghana Shippers' Council, the 
"Appropriate Authority" for the code in Ghana can ensure 
that all cargoes going to Ghana from U.K are channelled 
into the UKWAL pool. Figures are not available but it is 
known that a substantial amount of cargoes are shipped on 
outsider vessels. If all these cargoes could be diverted 
into the UKWAL pool, Ghana's contribution in the pool will 
increase, thereby increasing Black Star Line's share in the 
pool.
In the Continent—Ghana trade, Cowac does not have any pooling 
arrangement and what members carry depend, to a large extent 
on the Lines own marketing strength. Black Star Line can
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increase its marketing activities in the continent in 
order to obtain more cargoes for her vessels. Secondly, 
Ghana Shippers' Council can open an office in both 
London arrd Hamburg to monitor all cargoes going to Ghana, 
Most West African countries Shippers' Councils are 
doing this, and is helping their national lines a lot.
««
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CHAPTER FIUE
UJHAT IS HAPPENING IN COliJAC AND UKUJAL AS A 
RESULT OF THE C0P1ING INTO FORCE OF THE CODE
As mentioned in Chapter 3, shipping companies have 
reacted to the Nigerian economic crisis and its effects 
on Liner Shipping in West Africa in. two basic ways, 
trying to maintain schedules by carrying on as if nothing 
had happened; and tailoring schedules and service 
frequency to the level of demand. When it comes to the 
effects of the codecs implementation on COWAC and UKWAL 
operations, the situation is different,
5.1 nEMBERSHIP
There has been dramatic changes in membership of both 
UKWAL and COWAC since the coming into force of the code.
In COWAC, during a Principals' meeting held in November- 
1983 in Hamburg (which I happened to be present), as many 
as three new members were admitted into the conference.
Out of the three, two were from Nigeria, namely Great 
Britain Nigeria Line (GBN) and Nigeria Green Lines, Both 
Lines' membership were sponsored by the Nigerian Government 
with support from Nigeria National Shipping Lines (NNSL),- 
(since the inception of the code, the Government of Nigeria 
has been encouraging indegenous private lines to join the 
various Conferences operating to the country. This is seen 
as an effort to carry a substantial part of their own trade
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which hitherto was caEcried by foreign lines).. However, 
membership application from a Line in' West Germany was 
blocked by member lines from West Germany who insisted 
that the current members from West Germany are capable 
of carrying the German share of the trade and as such 
the membership of the new line should not be entertained.
It will interest the reader to know that in accordance 
with the Code's Article 1 on nembership, this new line 
satisfied all the membership entrance conditions. They 
even attached to their application a letter from their 
"Appropriate Authority", confirming their registration as 
a National Line, which automatically qualifies them to be 
members of the conference. This clearly contradicts EEC's 
Brussel Package which considers any Line in the community 
as a National Line.
It was clear to African I'lembers present at the meeting that 
while the Conference (dominated by Lines from Europe) were 
eager to admit new members from West Africa, they were not 
interested in admitting new members from Europe. Thus in 
effect, while they were particularly careful not to reduce 
the share of the trade o.f existing European member lines, 
they did not care about that of their West African partners.
In UKWAL, as far as membership is concerned, there has been 
a considerable decrease in membership, since the code came 
into force. Prior to the inception of the code, the 
Conference had eight members. Today membership has reduced
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to fiv/e. In 1984, some feu months after the code came 
into force, Hoegh Lines, the only third flag line in the 
Conference submitted their notice to withdraw from the 
Conference. Although no reason was giv/en, it was clear 
to members that Hoegh Lines feared that their existing 
share of the trade (6,1^) will be reduced drastically, 
judging from the pronouncements from African Lines who 
for years have criticised the 6,1^ share allocated to 
Hoegh Lines, a third flag country (African lines like 
Cnz and SITRAM whose countries contributed to the pool 
had 1,1^ and 3,4?S respectively).
In 1985, prior to a Principals' Meeting held in 
Copenhagen to discuss among other things. Members'shares 
in the pool, CMZ and SITRAM decided to withdraw from the 
Conference as full members. A look at Table 4.4 shows 
that their countries contribution to the pool averages 
1 , 2 %  and 2 , 1 %  respectively. Ivory Coast for instance is 
a country adhering strictly to the Code's sharing formula, 
and having taken cognisance of the fact that 40^ of their 
country's contribution to the pool (2.1^) will be only 
0,8^ obviously do not see any justification in their 
continued membership of the Conference, Ivory Coast's 
main trading partner is France whose trade is carried by 
COWAC and therefore with the coming into force of the code, 
their interest lies more in COUiAC than in UKWAL, The same 
situation applies to CMZ of Zaire. 40^ of Zaire's 
contribution to the pool comes to 0,5^, Both lines however
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declared their intentions of remaining in the Conference 
only as "dormant" members.
5.2 PARTICIPATION IN TRADE
5.2.1
As stated earlier, COWAC is considered as a "loose" 
Conference with no pooling arrangement and specific share 
of trade for member lines. The Secretariat does not 
monitor closely activities of member lines. During the 
November 1983 Principals' fleeting, a draft of a new 
Conference Agreement was submitted for Members' considera­
tion and approval. All provisions and Articles in this 
new. proposed Agreement were discussed and approved, with 
the exception of Article 17, dealing with shares in the 
trade. There was a deadlock when this topic was put up 
for discussion. Apparently, European lines had one stand 
while the African lines also had their own stand. On 
the eve of the meeting, the African lines had their own 
meeting and came up with the following, which was to be 
their common stand with regards to Article 17 of the 
Agreement. Among other things, the African 1‘ines wanted:
(l) To be considered as one group for the purpose of 
shares. They wanted the trade to be divided on 
the 40:40:20 basis and their 40^ left to them to 
be shared among the Lines from West Africa them­
selves, The Annex to Resolution 1 of the UNCTAD
Code allows this Here, it is stated in Part B,
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Participation in Trade, paragraph 4 that:
"National lines within a Region at one end 
are to have the flexibility of adjustments 
among themselves in regard to their shares",
(2) To participate in the 2 0 %  allocated to cross­
traders. It is the wish of African Lines to be 
considered as cross traders in each other African 
countries trade with Europe. This means that 
after taking their 40% share in their own 
country's trade with Europe, they will partici­
pate as cross traders in their neighbours trade.
No Agreement was reached at this meeting, so the proposed 
new Agreement could not be signed. Article 17 was still 
to be resolved. A committee was set up comprising six 
members;
- 2 Representatives from European National Lines
- 2 Representatives from African Lines
- 2 Representatives from Cross traders
to deliberate on the African proposals and other related 
issues and submit their recommendation to the Conference 
Secretariat, To date, the proposed Agreement has not 
been signed, as Article 17 still remain unresolved.
5.2.2
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ffs mentioned earlier, UKUJAL members held a Principals' 
Meeting in Copenhagen in May 1985, and top on the Agenda 
was the re—allocation of members' percentage shares in 
the pool. This was necessary because prior to this, shares 
were based on certain criteria, but with the coming into 
force of the code, there was the need to base shares on 
the UNCTAD formula. Also there had been the withdrawal 
of Hoegh Line, a third flag line, from the Conference, and 
SITRAM and CMZ have decided to operate only as”dormant” 
members.
Prior to this meeting there had been several meetings to 
determine the basis for the new shares. Apparently this 
issue remained unresolved meeting after meeting as 
Members could not come to any compromise. It was general­
ly agreed among members that sharing will be based on the 
UNCTAD formula but what was never resolved, until the 
Copenhagen meeting was whether to base shares on Member 
lines' previous years south bound (imports of African 
countries) or northbound (export) figures. Initially all 
the U.K lines wanted shares to be based on only one leg 
voyage, that is, southbound, while the African lines, 
except NNSL wanted shares t.o be based on the entire trade,- 
bJhat has been happening is that the U.K lines usually 
returned from West Africa in ballast as they considered 
the carriage of the West African exports unprofitable due
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to high loading expenses and long days in port due to low 
productivity in these ports. Thus if their total carriage 
is used, their share would be lower than when southbound 
alone is used. This was the opposite to the stand and 
position of African lines, especially Black Star Line and 
SITRAW, who stand to gain more if both northbound and 
southbound figures are used. WNSL opposed using both 
northbound and southbound figures because they knew that 
Nigeria's exports have not been as high as their imports, 
and as such they stand to loose if both trades are used, 
(This is seen in table 5.2). U.K Lines later, on knowing 
the shares were to be based on the UNCTAD principles 
became indifferent, as their position will be the same 
which ever method is used (See table 5.2). So, it was 
Nigeria against the rest. They alone wanted shares to be 
based on southbound alone. As they control over B0% of 
the trade, obviously their stand could not be overruled 
despite the fact that they were alone as against all others. 
They made it clear that voting will not decide the issue. 
Later, with the withdrawal of CMZ and SITRAM, Black Star 
Line's support was lost and as such the Secretariat based 
the shares on southbound figures only, thus bowing to the 
pressure from NNSL,
Table 5,1 shows the position of members shares now and 
prior to the Copenhagen meeting. Table 5.2 shows how the 
new figures were arrived at.
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TABLE 5.1 
UKWAL POOL SHARES
Lines Previous Current(Before Copenhagen) (After Copenhagen)
British Lines
m S L
BSL
Others
50. 00^ 
31.501 
7.723 
10.775 
100.00%
SOURCE: UKliiAL SECRETARIAT
53.00%
42.72
4.28
1 0 0 .ee%
In arriving at the new shares, the Secretariat .based their
calculations on the following:
(1) British Lines basic interest was assumed at 40%
(2) The percentage shares of African lines was 
restricted to those participating as full members
(3) The balance after calculating each line's 40% was 
split 50:50 between British and African lines , 
with the African lines portion, BSL and NNSL split 
between them according to their percentage shares
(4) No allowance was made for cross-traders. (The only 
cross trader in the Conference, Hoegh Lines withdrew 
their membership).
•9
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To begin with, basing calculations on UKWAL trade 
figures (southbound) from 1982-198A (table 4,4) after 
allocating 40% to British Lines, 40% of Nigeria and 
Ghana^s contribution to the pool was calculated as 
32,772% and 2,201% respectively. This totalled 75,034%, 
leaving a balance of 24,995%, This was further shared 
50:50 between British Lines and NNSL/BSL according to 
each lines percentage share, giving them 11,677% and 
0,806% respectively. This brought the final calculation 
to 52.483% for British lines, 3,067% for BSL and 44,450% 
for NNSL. This process was repeated using northbound 
figures alone, and again using a combined northbound/ 
southbound figures. As it has already been decided that 
shares are to be based on southbound only the final 
shares ought to have been 52.483% and 44,450% for British 
lines, BSL and NNSL respectively, but BSL knowing well 
that when a combined northbound/southbound figures are 
used will get them 5,513% instead of 3,067% protested,
A compromise solution was found to this. An average was 
struck between the southbound only shares and the 
combined northbound/southbound to arrive at the final 
agreed shares of 53% for British lines, 4,29% for BSL 
and 42.72% for NNSL.
SUr'IlviARY OF THE CALCULATIONS 
A, BRITISH LINES^ SHARE
= 40%
= 12.483
52,483% — (1)
(l) (Southbound only)
Share in trade (based on UNCTAD formula) 
50% of balance of 24.966
<9
13.994
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(2) (Combined MB/SB)
Given shares
50^ of balance of 27,989
Final Allocated Share (Average of
( 1) ,  ( 2) )
53.994% ---(2)
= 53%
B. NNSL SHARE
(1) (Southbound only)
Nigeria's contribution to pool = 81,9% = 81,9%
Ht
40& of contribution = 32,773
Proportional share in- balance = 11.677
44.450% ---(1)
(2) (Combined NB/SB)
Nigeria's contribution to pool = 70,4%
40% of contribution = 28,175
Proportional share in balance = 12.318
'40.49 3 % ---(2)
Final Allocated share (Average of
(1) (2) ) = 42.72%
C. BSL SHARE
(l) (Southbound only)
Ghana's contribution to pool = 5,65%
40% of contribution = 2,261%
Proportional share in balance = »806
3.067% ---(1)
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(2) (Combined NB/SB)
Ghana's contribution to pool = 9,58?S 
40^ of contribution = 3,836
Proportional share in. balance = 1,677
5.513fo---(2)
Final allocated share (Average of
( 1 )  ( 2 )  ) =  4 . 2 9 ^
The method used to arrive at the shares should not be
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allowed to pass without comment. All along, the 
Secretariat divided the trade between British Lines 
and African Lines and excluded cross traders. This 
pre-supposes that shares will be in line with the Annex 
to Resolution 1 of the code, Section B, dealing with 
Participation in Trade, which calls for Equality of 
Rights of national lines at the two ends”. This means 
that the British group and the African group should have 
equal rights. How come then, that, the total share of the 
British group is 53^ as to the 47?S of African Lines. At 
least, after calculations, the final figures ought to have 
reflected a 50:50 share between the two groups. Before 
the advent of the code, the total share of the British 
lines was 50^ while that for African lines and the only 
cross trader was 50/o (see table 3,2). It is therefore 
unacceptable that today that the shares are being based on 
the UNCTAD formula and provisions which call for "equal 
rights", British lines shares should exceed 50^, A i 
question that may be asked is "why did the African lines
agree to this?" Perhaps judging from the figures one 
can say that NNSL did not see the need, so long as they 
had acquired a substantial increase in their shares 
(from 31,501^ to 42,72^). On BSU^s part perhaps Ghana's 
contribution to the pool weakens her bargaining power and 
can therefore not be in a position to push harder. It 
would only have been possible with the support of NNSL, 
for BSL to challenge the rational behind British lines 
share exceeding 50%, but as indicated earlier, NNSL are 
better off than they used to be so they will not see the 
need to support any challenge put up by BSL,
Another flaw in the shares calculation is why if was 
based mainly on southbound figures, and not only on the 
entire trade, that is, combined northbound and southbound. 
The Conference covers both northbound and southbound 
trades and as such there is no justification irr deciding 
to base shares on southbound carryings. It is agreed 
that the Conference Pooling Arrangement covers only 
southbound trade but this has been the result of British 
lines not keen on loading northbound due to the dis­
economies inherent in the' northbound trade, and should 
have nothing to do with determining members shares in 
the trade. The code, in my opinion, does not only talk 
of shares in a Pool but also shares in a Trade. Shares 
should have been based on the entire trade covered by 
the Conference and the northbound portion which any line 
may refuse to carry put in a pool for member lines who^  
want to lift them to do so. After all, under Annex to
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TffBLE 5.2
UKUIAL SHARES
USING 1982-1984 FIGURES
SOUTHBOUND
( 1) ( 2)
British
Ghana
Nigeria
(3)
40% of % Balance % Total 
Total Basis Cols(l)
SB Col(l) (2)
40«0D0 12,483 52,483
2.2B1 0,806 3,067
32.773 11.677 44.450
NORTHBOUND COMBINED
(4) (5) (6) I (7) ^ (8)  ^(9)
40% of % Balance % Total 40% of % Balance % Total
Total
NB
Basis
Col(4)
40,000 19,075
9.132 7.972
12.718 11.103
Cols(4)
(5)
59.075
17.104
23.821
T otal 
NBjSB
Basis
Col(7)
40,000 13.994
3.836 1.677
28.175 12,318
Cols(7)
( 8 )
53.994
5.513
40.493
( 10)
Average' 
(3) (9)
53.GO 
4.29 
42.72
75.034 24.966 100.000 
24.966
61.850 38.150 100.000 
38.150
72.011 27.989 100,000 
27.989
100.000 100.000 100.00
100.00
SOURCE: UKWAL SECRETARIAT
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"If National lines do not carry, or are unable to 
carry their allocated share of the trade and on 
this point they themselves sKall make the 
decision - that PORTION of their share of the 
trade which they do not carry will revert to the 
pool to be share pro rata".
R e s o lu t io n  1 o f  the  code, S e c t io n  B, paragraph 3 s t a t e s
t h a t :
5. 3
It was mentioned in Chapter A under "The Code's Effects 
on BSL Liner Operations" that it is not every Line in 
the developing world which will benefit from the code. 
What is happening in UKWAL with regards to shares, goes 
a long way to trumpet this assertion. While it has 
enhanced the position of NNSL, it has pushed BSL into 
an uncomfortable position. With her shares in the trade 
reduced from 1,1% to 4.29/S the line will no doubt be 
thinking about their future as far as Liner Shipping is 
concerned, particularly, their continued membership of 
the UKWAL Conference,.
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ASSESSMENT AND C0NCLU5IDN.
6.1. FUTURE OF CONFERENCES OPERATING- TO liJEST AFRICA.
U/e have already discussed the importance of Nigeria in 
Liner Shipping in. West Africa, her cargoes accounting for 
some 60% of cargoes carried by the Continent-West Africa 
Conference (COWAC) and about 85% of cargoes carried by 
the United Kingdom-West Africa Conference (UKWAL). Inva­
riably, any conference vessel going to West Africa calls»«
at one or two ports in Nigeria, We have also discussed 
the various bodies being set up by countries in West 
Africa to help implement the UNCTAD Code, in an attempt 
to make their national lines carry their national trade, 
at least 40% as stipulated by the UNCTAD cargo sharing 
formula. Cargo reservation or luhat is known as the "a 
priori" Control of cargo is being practised v.igorously in 
countries like Ivory Coast and Cameroon, where almost all 
national cargoes are moved by SITRAM and CAMSHIP respecti­
vely, Mention has also been made of the effect of Nigeria^ 
economic upheavals on COWAC and UKWAL operations, not for­
getting also its direct effect on the operations of some 
national lines like the Black Star Line (BSL) of Ghana,
From the above, it will therefore seem that the future of 
the Conferences operating to West Africa, in the wake of 
the coming into force of the Code, depends to a large ex­
tent on these two factors :
a) The future of Nigeria^ economy, and
o
95
b) What countries in West Africa are going to make 
of the bodies set up to implement the Code,
However, it seems that the first point is more related to 
UKWAL while the second .is related to CQWAC.
B.1.1 FUTURE OF NIGERIA^:S ECONDIyIY.
One important factor which will determine the future of 
the Conferences operating to West Africa is the economic 
position of Wigeria, a country whose cargo is the life­
blood of these Conferences, As seen in Chapter Three, Ni-
««
geria% economic,problems starting from 1981 had had disas­
trous effect on operations of both COWAC and UKWAL,
UKWAL for example, reckons that currently trade has been 
running at around 60^ below the 1981 level, 10 or 11 ves­
sels were leaving U,K, each month but now not more than 5 
vessels sail a month,
A look at Table 6.1 shows that there has been a direct re- 
lation between Nigeria^ imports and the UKWAL trade. From 
1981 to 1984 the percentage decrease in Wigerian imports 
carried by UKWAL has been decreasing at the same rate as 
that of UKWAL total carryings to West Africa, This cannot 
be said of changes in Ghana% figures. For example in 1983 
while the percentage decrease for UKWAL and Nigeria were -5B% 
& - 58^ respectively, that for Ghana was -8^. The following
year UKWAL had -62^, Nigeria —65^ but Ghana had an. increase 
of +9%, It therefore seems that UKWAL is much dependent on 
Nigeria^ foreign trade. As has been mentioned already, the
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future of UKWAL as a Conference depends on the future of 
Nigeria^ economy. If Nigeria^ foreign trade continues to 
fall like is happening now under their so-called "auste-i , 
rity" UKUiAL might cease to be a Conference,
As far as GhanaS position is concerned, there is the ten­
dency of UKUiAL becoming a Nigeria-United Kingdom affair. 
That is, the Conference is gradually shifting towards a 
bi-lateral sort of arrangement. As mentioned earlier,
C,M^Z, (Zaire), SITRAM (Ivory Coast) and Hoegh Lines (Nor­
way) have all ceased to be members of the Conference lea­
ving it for the U,K, Lines, Nigeria^ N,N.,S,L, and Ghana% 
B,S,L, Black Star Linefe percentage share in the cargo pool 
has fallen from 7,7^ to 4,3^.
This year by June, the line had finished carrying her per­
centage share of the pool with only two sailings (in the 
previous year •B,S,L, had four sailings). This means her 
vessels will have to seek employment elsewhere for the 
rest of the year. It is obvious that if the trend conti-^  
nues, there is every possibility that B,S,L, may leave the 
Conference, The only thing that can. save the situation is 
a substantial increase in Ghanafe imports so as to increase 
her con.tribution in the UKWAL cargo pool whic-h. will subse­
quently increase B,S,L,^ percentage share of the pool. So 
long as the Codes formula is used to decide shares, and 
Ghana% imports are not increasing, the only ultimate result 
might be the withdrawal of B,S,L, from UKU/AL, leaving the 
Conference for the U,K., lines and N.,N,S,L,
a
TABLE B.1
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UKWAL TRADE FIGURES (-in Tonnes).
YEAR UKWAL --%----CHANGE NIGERIA
---%--CHANG£ GHANA CHANGE
1981 1,514,476 (+0.3) 1,296,149 i + n 78,658 (-23)
1982 1,048,072 (-30) 889,536 (-31) 44,307 (-44)
1983 663,723 (-56) 538,976 (-58) 40,818 (-8)
198A 578,966 (-62) 448,363 (-65) 44,332 (+9)
SOURCE ; UKWAL SECRETARIAT.
6 . 1 . 2  IWPLEIviENTaTION OF THE CODE.
»4
How the various countries in West Africa are going to im^ 
plement the Code, will to a large extent also determine 
the future of some of the Conferences operating to the 
sub-region. This factor will affect COWAC more than UKWAL. 
This because, as mentioned in previous chapters, all the 
Francophone countries in West Africa have of late set up 
their National Shipping Lines (some are yet to own. a vessel) 
and are all members of COWAC (but not UKWAL) due to the 
simple reason that their trade is more with France than 
with any country. French ports fall within the COWAC range 
of ports, with the COWAC Southern Section run from Paris.
We have already discussed the various scheme developed by 
countries in. West Africa to help them implement the Code.
It can be seen that in. West Africa the implementation of 
the Code is more rigid in the Francophone countries than 
in the Anglophone countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia,
Sierra Leone and Liberia). Ivory Coast and Cameroon for
9
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example adhere to the so-called ”a priori" control df car­
go which invariably ensures that all national cargoes go 
on their own vessels^ and vessels of their trading part­
ners, Almost all these Francophone countries have bi-la­
teral trade agreements with France and some other coub-*? ■ 
tries, under which their trade are conducted on their 
National fleet. If these countries manage, through their 
Shippers Councils to commandeer all government and import— 
licence—covered goods as is happening in Ivory Coast, Ca­
meroon and Gabon, then there will be no cargo left for 
third flag vessels. COWAC does not have the Eargo f^ oo- 
ling System, and this means all the numerous third flag 
lines in the Conference will have to either fight for the 
few "leftovers" which will be available or find business 
elsewhere. If this happens, the Conference will disintegra­
te, As indicated in 'an earlier Chapter all these Franco­
phone countries have vessels just enough to carry their 
national trade, so one cannot hope to get any surplus as 
is the case in Nigeria,
Although most of the European members of COWAC have,criti­
cised the setting up of Freight Booking Bureaux by some 
West African countries, these West African countries are 
determined to see to it that these Freight Bureaux work 
in their favour. They have set up their- hational fleet 
and they must find cargo for them. There are complaints 
that some countries like Ivory Coast and Cameroons Ship— 
Councils who administer the cargo allocationpers
gg
even go beyond consolidating their 40^ of their share of 
the trade. They have also instituted sanctions for not 
shipping on national fleet. One of these sanctions is the 
forefeiture of import licence allocation the following 
year. These sanctions will force all nationals to use na­
tional vessels, thus killing operations of other member 
lines of the Conference who hitherto^ competed on equal 
terms with the national lines where they existed, or domi­
nated the trade where the country did not have a national 
fleet,
•c
6.2 FUTURE LINE OF ACTION BY liJEST AFRICAN NATIONAL LINES 
IN. CONFERENCES,
Article 3 of B.russels Package states that
” Where a Liner Conference operates a pool of 
a berthing, sailing and/or any form of cargo 
allocation agreement in accordance with Arti­
cle 2 of the Code of Conduct, the volume of 
cargo to which the group of national shipping 
lines of each Member State participating in 
thetrade or the Shipping Lines of the Member 
States participating in that trade'as a third 
country shipping lines are entitled under the 
Code shall be redistributed.......... The re­
distribution of cargo ^ shares shall be carried 
out on the basis of a unanimous decision by 
those shipping lines which are members of the 
Conference and participate in the redistribu-
tion with a v/iew to all those lines carrying 
a fair share of the Conference trade,*'
ff look at both UKWAL and COWAC membership shows that the 
African Lines'counterparts are covered by this Article, as 
they are all coming from the E,E,C, (in COWAC a few are 
from the Eastern Bloc countries). This is further demon­
strated in the UKWAL's lattest cargo sharing calculations 
in which the U,K, lines were allocated 53% which were to 
be re-allocated between the three lines, (see pages 86-88),
I am of the strong opinion that it will be beneficial to 
the West African Members of the Conference if they also 
came together, forced for a recognition as one group and 
then after securing the share of the group, redistributed 
their shares. This can. be done by the application of com­
mercial principles, taking into account, in particular, of;
a) The volume of cargo generated by each Line's country's 
cargo contribution in the pool,
b) Past performance of the shipping lines in the Conference 
trade.
c) The needs of the Shippers whose cargoes are being car­
ried by the Conference,
i
Out of the IB countries in West African, covered by UKWAL, 
Nigeria and Ghana's contribution into the pool currently 
amounts to about 88^, Since their national lines are the 
only two members from the Sub-region, it will be fair, 
judging from their contribution, for the Conference to re­
cognise them as one group for the purpose of allocation
100,
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of shares. In this case the U,K, lines will take 50% (in 
the absence of any cross -trader in the pool) and the West 
Africa group also take 50%, This is, the trade is shared 
equally between Britain Lines and West African lines.
If Article 3 of the Brussels Package allows for re-distri­
bution of shares among the U,K, Lines so does the Code's 
Article 2, paragrah 8 also allows for shares re-distribu- 
tion for the West Africa lines. Here it is stated that;
, ” The National Shipping lines of a region, members 
of a Conference at one end of the trade cov&red 
by the Conference, may re-distribute among them­
selves by mutual agreement the shares in the 
trades allocated to them............ ”
Perhaps this can be done more effectively through the Mi­
nisterial Conference of Central and West African States. 
They have the negotiation machinery to get the Conferences 
European members to table for negotiations.
Looking at Table 5,2 dealing with the method used in arri­
ving at the current pool shares in UKWAL, if the above was 
considered as the basis for the shares, the African lines,
i.e,, B.S.L, and N,N,S,L. would have been better off. This 
is seen in Table 6,3 which shows what the situation would 
be if Africa lines are considered as a group. All the U.K, 
lines, as a group would have got 50% and BSL/NNSL as a 
group also getting 50%, 'If the 50% is split between S.,S,L, 
and N^ ra.,5,L, basing the sharing on their countries contri­
bution in the pool N,N,S,L, gets 45% and B,S,L, 5% instead
(50/50 BETUiEEIM BRITISH GROUP AND AFRICAN GROUP). (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES).
TABLE 6 . 3  : SUGGESTED |YIETH0D TO BE USED IN DETERiTIMING UKliiAL SHARES.
!
,’50/50
SOUTHBOUND ONLY
(2)
BALANCE
----------- r
(3) ;
TOTAL
.. .
COMBINED NORTHBOUND/SDUTH  ^BOUND. j 
(4) (6) ^
50/50 BALANCE TOTAL ‘
AVERAGE J 
(3),(6) j
BRITISH • 50 - 50 J 50 — 50 ! 50 !
GHANA ■ 3 0.5 f3.5 5 1.5 6.5 ■ 5
NIGERIA I  41 5.5 46.5 1 35 8.5 43.5 t 45 1
j 94 6.0 100 ! 90 10.0 100.0 I 100 J
f B I 10 !
! 100 r 100 ! 1
ASSUMPTIONS ;
1, In the absence of any cross-trader trade is shared 50/50 between British Lines and 
West African l,ines (based on the Code's equqlity principle),
• B,S,L, and N.,N,S,L, shares determined using their countries contribution in pool (6% 
B2% respectively for Southbound; and 10^, 70^ for combined Northbound/Southbound),
k
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of their allocated 42,71% and 4.2% respectively. This 
shows that N,N,S,L, are currently losing muchy as a conse— 
ouence of the method used in arriving at the current shares.
If this suggested method is used, in future if there is 
any new line from U,K,, the line simple partakes in the 50% 
allocated to Britain lines, and likewise if any African 
national line decides to enter the trade, her share would 
come from the 50% allocated to the African lines.
6.3 COST CONSEQUENCES OF CARGO RESERl/ATION. '
The term cargo reservation and flag discrimination are 
near synonyms for the various forms of flag protection 
practised by a growing number of countries. People who are 
against these practices say that they constitute non—ta­
riff barriers which impede world trade, raise the cost of 
ocean transport and engender inefficiency.
This assertion is proved by Dr G.H, Bast and W.N, Kieft in 
3 case study published in the book '*The future of Liner 
Shipping".(see reference). In this case study which is 
based on actual trade figures, a comparison is marJe bet­
ween two distinct shipping practices in respert of liner 
services between two trading areas; one on the basis of a
a co-operative agreement between, the carriers ( a Confe­
rence) , the other on basis of the application of cargo re­
servation laws ( bi-lateral agreement ), The underlying
•philosophy behind this case study is that in a line econo­
mic viability can be attained, respectively improved by 
optimal routeing, rationalisation and intelligent co-ope­
ration, This will not benefit only the carriers, be they 
state-owned or private liner companies but in a much wider 
scope also the communities they serve.
To summarise this study, it was seen that under bi-lateral 
arrangements vessels sailed from several countries in. one 
region (say. West Africa) destined for the same overseas 
ports. It was revealed.that it is foolish to operate liner 
services between two trading areas in this manner. Not on­
ly would the operation be uneconomical, causing freight 
rates to be higher than necessary, the greater number of 
ships required would cause port congestion or aggravate it, 
where it already exist. This would slow down the turn- 
round of the ships and thus lower their effective carrying 
capacity. Secondly this concept has the effect of depriving 
all the participants of the opportunity to improve their 
economies of scale. By spliting up their transport markets 
in separate enclaves, they condemn themselves to the use of 
slower and less efficient tonnage (it must be noted here that 
this bi-lateral concept is likened to the UNCTAD AO-40-20 
leaving out the 20%, The AO-AO which is the bulk is just 
like a bi-lateral arrangement).
The cost consequence of bi-lateralism as against normal li­
ner services is summarised in Table 6,2, The -.study revea— 
l.ed that a side effect of the bi-lateral operation, which
4
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cannot be quantified financially, is that the 28 ships ma­
ke 857 port calls per annum whereas the joint service ves­
sel make 400 calls per year for the same amount of cargo. 
The "bunching" of the ships in the ports on both sides of 
the ocean, is bound to increase cost (congestion of ports 
and terminals, delays to vessels etc.). From Table 6,2 we' 
see that the overall cost under the bi-lateral concept 
exceeds that of Joint Service by 44,8% which is a collosal 
figure. The concluding portion of the study showed that 
the total cost consequence of the bi-lateral versus the 
multi—carrier concept % 13,194,895 more, and consequently, 
by calculation, the freight revenue require on increase of 
% 16,53 per ton.
Bringing this study closer home, it is some how proved 
right. If one takes for instance the cargo reservation, 
practices going on in. West Africa, it would be seen that 
the ultimate result will be increase in freight rate due 
to high operational cost of the national lines of the sub- 
region which stems from in efficiency, irrational sailings 
and uneconomical operations: Most of these countries under 
the Code reserve almost all their national cargo to their 
national fleet, which in. most cases are inefficient. Their 
breakeven points are so high due to high operational cost, 
and in the long run will lead to increase in freight rates. 
Perhaps the national importers and exporters will be pa­
ying more to their national carriers than they would have 
paid if normal liner services were being conducted in the
SUIvinARY OF COST CONSEQUENCES
COST ITEMS A B A EXCEEDS B BYBILATERAL CONCEPT 
$
JOINT SERVICE 
$ %
Capital Cost
Repairs & Maintenance
Insurance
20^ of Investment 26,429,600 18,460,800 7,968,800 43.2
Port Expenses 1,117,664 830,768 ■ 286,896 34.5
Crew Cost 8,831,000 5,692,000 3,139,000 55.1
Bunkers 6,261,200 4,461,000 1,800,200 a •
TOTAL 42,639,464 29,444,568 13,194,895 44.8
1, 28 ships serve Bilateral arrangement
2, 8 ships are used in the joint service *
3, The same amount of cargo carried by A & B,
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region.
I am of the opinion that the basic pattern, of transport e -  
conomy is no way different from that of other economic 
activities, that is, it must provide the best possible 
cost whilst procuring an. acceptable return on investment.
In accordance with customary economic appraisement, opti­
mal quality of service in liner shipping inevitably en­
tails also speed and frequency whilst the yield is highly 
sensitive to the degree of useful occupancy of the produc­
tion units engaged in the process. If these conditions are 
met; sound operation of services is assured; if these are 
brushed aside liner shipping will be doomed to flounder in 
an endless bog of frustation. It is however my fervent hope 
that national lines of West Africa prove this case study 
wrong by giving their various countries and Shippers the 
optimum economic service in order not to cause freight ra­
tes to increase.
6,3 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE CODE,
The Code of Conduct came into force on. the 6th October 
1983, after the required number of States had ratified it, 
Most countries hope to benefit from this new order, so the 
question of its possible economic effects becomes one to 
which our attention should be turned.
As indicated by S,G, ^Sturmey during the International Sym­
posium held at Bremen (see references) the type of econo­
mic effects which could be produced by the Code may be
o
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categorised as two. First is the possible effect on.the
level of world income as a whole and the second is the
effect on. the distribution of income. However, it is high
ly unlikely that the effect on the global effects of the
Code will be largely non-economic, for example, the
strengthening of the weak against the strong to secure a
more equitable bargaining situation. Professor Sturmey
thinks the transfer effect will be much more important,
and economically, it is from there the major economic
changes will occur. Although the measureable effects of
(■the Code of Conduct on world incomes are likely to be 
small, they will be favourable. They will arise from 
change in the location of economic activity, and this 
will be the main factor. But there should be other over 
all gains from improvements in efficiency and a lessening 
of monopoly powers arising from the process of consulta­
tion.
It seems that developing countries have a strong compara­
tive advantage in conventional shipping, Uie have heard 
for sometime now that liner shipping is unprofitable in 
the rich countries, and that a shift in the world divi- ' 
sion of economic function under which some of this was mo 
ved to poor countries should be a favourable move, leadin 
the world nearer to an optimum allocation of resources 
rather than a move leading to a position further from the 
optimum. Some shipping economists feel that if there was 
a choice, liner shipping would practically have died out
o
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in developed countries and would now be a virtual monopoly 
of developing countries since it is the most labour using 
area of shipping. However one should not think that because 
developing countries may today have a comparative advantage 
over developed countries in conventional liner shipping 
they are going to remain tied to an out-dated technology 
while the traditional maritime nations retain their present 
position of strength by adopting the most modern technolo­
gies. I^ ’must be borne in mind that shipping is an interna­
tional industry. There are parts of ocean borne trade which, 
for the foreseable future, will more economically b'a carried 
by fairly conventional vessels. In a system operating under 
the principles of classical economic^^these would be operated 
and owned in developing countries. We may now turn our 
attention to the question of income transfers. In most deve­
loped countries they believe that their shipping industries 
will suffer economic loss, as a result of the Code, Some 
even mention a loss of ^ 1000 million per annum. What is not 
clear is whether this is being canvassed as a straight for­
ward economic loss or whether it is a transfer from some Eu­
ropean countries to those developing and other countries 
which stand the Code, The income transfers which are likely 
to occur as a result of the Code have several facets. Ob­
viously the increases in income which would occur also imply 
a transfer; indeed the most important could not occur without' 
a transfer. Other transfers are likely to be neutral as far 
as income level is concerned.
They will occur in a number of ways, for example, through 
the moderating effect of the Code on freight rate increa­
ses, the assistance to developing countries exports by 
promotional freight rates. Not all transfers will be from 
rich countries to poor countries and some will occur 
within, these groups. However the major transfer will be 
from rich to poor, to the generators of a.large part of 
world trade but the carrier of a share which is signifi­
cantly smaller, to those who ultimately bear the force of
most freight rate increases but have little or no say in««
their determination, to those who could economically build 
up their economies by expanding their liner fleets but 
have to go cap in hand and beg to be allowed to carry their 
own trade. This sort of transfer is what economic develop­
ment is all about.
So far as the Code is concerned, any income transfer, so 
far as the loss by the rich countries is concerned, will 
almost certainly be a slowing down in the rate of increase 
of income rather than a reduction. There is no*evidence at 
all to suggest that the long term growth of .Morld trade is 
going to be reversed, despite present tendencies* and there­
fore there is plenty of scope for individual.shipping lines 
in developed countries which might find themselves losing 
trade as a result of the cargo allocation rules of the Code 
to move into other types of shipping. It is observed that 
changes are not going to occur overnight since most develo­
ping countries have neither the fleets to take up their
I l l
In conclusion, it can be said that the world as a whole 
will economically gain from the Code; some poor countries 
will gain something at the expense of the rich. But basi­
cally the Code is not about income transfer. The Code is 
about justice and redressing of the balance of disadvan­
tage, It is about the creation, of a new deal and better 
order.
shares im m e d ia te ly  nor the  cash to expand those f l e e t s  r a ­
p i d l y .
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Signatures and ratification of, or accessions to, the Convention on a Code 
o f Conduct for Liner Conferences.
The countries, arranged in chrnnologic<il order of signing, arc:
Ghana 24 June l')7.S r
Chile 2.S June l'J75 %
Pakistan 27 June I')75 $
Ciamhia 30 June 1975 5
Sri Lanka .30 June 1975 <(
Vcncnicla 30 June 1975
Bangladesh 24 Julv 1975 a
Nigeria 10 September 1975 a
Benin 27 October 1975 a
United Republic of Tanzania 3 November 1975 a
Niger 13 January 1976 r
Philippines 2 March 1976 r
Guatemala 3 March 1976 r
Mexico 6 May 1976 a
United Republic of Cameroon 15 June 1976 a
Cuba 23 June 1976 a
Indonesia I I  .lanuarv 1977 r
Ivory Coast 17 February 1977 r
Central African Republic 13 May 1977 a
Senegal 20 May 1977 r
Zaire 20 July 1977 a
Madagascar 23 December 1977 a
Togo 12 January I97R r
Cape Verde 13 January 1978 a
India 14 February 1978 T
Kcnva 27 Fchruarv 1978 a
Mali 15 March 1978 a
Sudan 16 March 1978 a
Gabon 5 June 1978 r
P.thiopia f September 1978 r
irai) 25 October 1978 a
Costa Rica 27 October 1978- r
Peru 21 November 1978 a
ngypt 25 January 1979 a
Tunisia 15 March 1979 a
Republic of Korea I I  Mav 1979 a
Czechoslovakia 2 June 1979 app
Hondur.as 4 June 1979 a
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 28 June 1979 acc
German Democratic Republic 9 Julv 1979 r
Sierra Leone 9 Julv 1979 a
Uruguay 9 Julv 1979 a
Bulgaria 12 July 1979 a
Guyana 7 Fchruarv 1980 a
Morocco I I  Fchruarv 1980 a
Jordan 11 March 1980 . a
Yugoslavia 7 Julv 1980 r
Guinea 19 August 1980 a
Mauritius 16 September 1980 a
China 23 September 1980' a
Barbados 29 October 1980 a
Romania 7 Jamiarv 1982 a
Lebanon 30 April 1982 a
Jamaica 20 Julv 1982 a
Congo 26 Julv 1982 a
Malaysia 27 August 1982 a
Federal Republic of Germany! 6 April 1983 r
Netherlands! 6 April 1983 r
Trinidad and Tobago 3 August 1983 a
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1 * The Brussels Package
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No, 954/79 o fl5  May 1979 concerning the  raiilication by Member Stales of. or 
their accession to, the United Nations Convenlion on a Code of Conduct of kiner Cunrcrences.
THE COUNCIL OK THE EUROfEAN COMMUNIl IIS
(
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 84 
(2) thereof, having regard to the draft Regulation submitted by the Commission, having regard to the opinion 
of the European Parliameni, having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee.
Whereas a Convenlion on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences has been drawn up by a Conference 
convened under the auspices of the United Naliuiis Conference on Trade and Development and is open for 
raiilication or accession;
Whereas the questions covered by the C ik Ic of Conduct are of importance not only to the Member Stales but 
also to the Community, in particular from the shipping and trading viewpoints, and it is therefore imporiani 
that a common position sliould be adopted in relation to this Code; „
Whereas this common position should respect the principles and objectives of the Treaty and make a major 
contribution to meeting the aspirations of developing countries in the held of shipping while at the same lime 
pursuing the objective of the coniiiiuing applicaijun in this held of the commercial principles applied by 
shipping lines of the oi.u> countries;
Whereas to secure observance of these principles and objectives, since the Code of Conduct contains no 
provision allowing the accession of the Community as such, it is important that Member Stales ratify or 
accede to the arrangeincnis provided for in this Regulation;
Whereas the stabilising rolc'of conferences in ensuring reliable services to shippers is recognised, but it is 
nevertheless necessary to avoid possible breaches by conferences of the rules of cumpetitiun laid down in the 
Treaty; whereas the Commission will accordingly forward to the Council a proposal for a Regulation 
concerning the application of those rules to .sea transport.
HAS ADOFTEO THtS REOULATtUN
Ariiflu  I
1. When ratifying the United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, or when 
acceding thereto. Member States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations in writing that 
such ratification or accession has taken place in accordance with this Regulation.
2. The instrument of ratification or accession shall be accompanied by the reservations set out in Annex 1. 
Article  2
1. In the case of an existing conference, each group of shipping lines of the same nationality which are 
members thereof shall determine by commercial negotiations with another shipping line of that nationality 
whether the latter may participate as a national shipping line in the said conference.
If  a new conference is created, the shipping lines of the same nationality shall determine by commercial 
negotiations which of them may participate as a national shipping line in the future conference.
2. Where the negotiations referred to in paragraph I fail to result in agreement, each Member State may, at 
the request of one of the lines cona'rned iind after hearing all of them, take the necessary steps to settle the 
dispute.
i .  Each Member State shall ensure that all vessel-operating shipping lines established on its territory under 
the Treaty establishing the European Econumic Community are treated in the same way as liners which have 
their management head oHice on its territory and the elFcclive control of which is exercised there.
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Article .1
agrecmeni in accordant whhAMicle 2 oHlI ° C o *  of allocation
national shipping lines of each Member State p a ^ W p a tin g S ^  <o which the group of
States participating in that trade as third-cotintry^shinnin. i; ^
redistributed, unless a decision is taken to the co^ are entitled under the Code shall be
and panics to the present redistribution rules. The rcdKirihnfinn "  ''^  ^***  ^njcmjxrrs of the Conference
basis ofa unanimous decision bv lho.se shipping lines which nrc mcm^r« nf i ^  carried out on the
r ” " " '  ' * " "  - f
"" !■» s»to .b„» ,„dc i.
!r! lines in the trade covered by the pool-
(r/1 the needs of the K " 'w h o s e lV r g o [ r a r e  ca^ States;
II. Any dispute not settled by thc conciliaiion procedure ma v u-ri, fh procedure set out in Annex
arbitration. In that event, the award of the
be InrW reJiei^d“',lJrg"im^^ parapaphs 1.2 and 3 shall
viewpoint of providing adequate and enicieni services to shippers^’  ^ 'I":
Article 4
of Conduct and n oraJ 'oE C D  countT ,^  shl^^ line''<irinothc; M ^m Sr Sm V ' h
c o n f ^ ; r e T r ^ £ ° n ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^
countries which are parties I o X  o id l  ^  ’" ’1 '»>' othir oecd
shipping lines ofa deveS"n7counrrv which l e ?  T ' ^  ^ of Conduct, of the
which are: ^ «=n?niscd as national shipping lines under the Code and
(a) already members of a conference serving these trades: or 
I admitted to such a conference under Article I (3) of the Code.
. .n iy i . ,  r . “ '
relationships or, on a reciprocal basis in re i'iiir.n i...i.’ °  'o Chapter V I of the Code in their mutual 
other procedures for settling disnutcs hate t^e ^  countries where
advantage of the p o s s ib i I i t ie s " p ? S b y r r tS e 2 5 7 S  7 ' ' "  7 ! '  fol'
procedures other than those laid down in S p ”  v V S S ^ '  d e ^ ^
Article S
Article 6
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member Stales.
Done at Brussels, 15 M ay 1979
Far the Council 
The President 
R. Baulin
Tlw Brussi'h Packuiji’
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ANNliX I 
KHStKVATIONS
When rulifying the Convention or when ucceJing thereto, Member States shall enter the following three 
reservations and interpretative reservation:
1. For the purposes of the Code of Conduct, the term 'national shipping line* may, in the case of a Member 
Slate of the Community, include any vessel-operating shipping line established on the territory of such 
Member Slate in accordance with the la.c Treaty.
2. (u) Without prejudice to paragraph (h) of this reservation, Article 2 of the Code of Conduct shall not be 
applied in conference trades between the Member Slates of the Community or, on a reciprocal basis, between 
such Slates and other oucu countries which are parties to the Code.
(b) Point (u) shall not alTcci the opportunities for participation as third country shipping lines in such 
trades, in accordance with the principles rellected in Article 2 of the Code, of the shipping lines of a developing 
country which are recognised as national shipping lines under the Code and which arc:
(i) already members of a conference serving these trades;
(ii) admitted to such a conference under Article I (3) of the Code.
3. Articles 3 and 14 (9) of the Code of Conduct shall not be applied in conference trades between the .« 
Member Stales of the Community or, on a reciprocal basis, between such Slates and the other o e c u  countries 
which are parlies to the Code.
4. !n trades to which Article 3 of the Code of Conduct applies, the last sentence of that Article is interpreted 
as meaning that:
(uj the two groups of national shipping lines will coordinate their positions before voting on matters 
concerning the trade between their two countries;
(h) this sentence applies sole!) to matters which the conference agreement identifies as requiring the 
assent oT both groups of national shipping lines concerned, and not to all matters covered by the 
conference agreement.
ANNEX It
CONCILIATION REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3 (3j
The parlies to the dispute shall designate one or more conciliators.
Should they fail to agree on the mutter, each of the parties to the dispute shall designate a conciliator and the 
conciliators thus designated shall co-opt another conciliator to act us chairman. Should a party fail to 
designate a conciliator or the conciliators designated by the parlies fail to reach agreement on the chairman, 
the President of the International Chamber of Commerce shall, at the request of one of the parlies, make the 
necessary designations.
The conciliators shall make every endeavour to settle the dispute. They shall decide on the procedure to be 
followed, Their fees shall be paid by the parties to the dispute.
NON-EEC MEMBERS OF OECD
Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Stales.
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Annex 1
CONVENTION ON A CODE OF CONDUCl' FOK LINER CONFERENCES
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES
The Contracting Parties to the present Convention,
Desiring to improve the liner conference system,
' Recognizing the need for a universally acceptable code o f 
conduct for liner conferences,
'Taking into account the special needs and problems ol 
the developing countries with respect to the activities o f 
liner conferences serving their foreign trade.
Agreeing to reflect in tlie Code tlie following fundamen­
tal objectives and basic principles;
(a j The objective to facilitate the orderly expansion o f 
world sea-borne trade;
(b) The objective to stimulate the development o f 
regular and efflcient liner services adequate to the require­
ments o f the trade concerned;
(c) The objective to ensure a balance o f interests 
between suppliers and users o f liner sliipping services;
(d) The principle that conference practices should not 
involve any discrimination against the shipowners, shippers 
or the foreign trade o f any country;
(e) The principle that conferences hold meaningful 
consultations with shippers’ organizations, shippers rej)- 
resentatives and shippers on matters o f common interest, 
w ith, upon request, the participation o f appropriate auth­
orities;
( f)  The principle that conferences should make available 
to interested parties pertinent information about tlieir 
activities which are relevant to those parties and sliould 
publish meaningful information on their activities.
Have agreed as follows;
Part one 
Chapter I  
DEFINITIONS
Liner conference or conference
A group o f two or more vessel-operating carriers which 
provides international liner services for the carriage o f cargo 
on a particular route or routes w ithin specified geographical 
limits and which has an agreement or arrangement, what­
ever its nature, w ithin the framework o f which they operate 
under uniform or common freight rates and any other 
agreed conditions w ith respect to the provision ol liner 
services.
National shipping line
A national shipping line o f any given country is a 
vessel-operating carrier which has its head office o f manage­
ment and its effective control in that country and is 
recognized as such by an appropriate authority o f that 
country or under the law o f that country.
Lines belonging to and operated by a jo in t venture 
involving two or more countries and in whose equity tlie 
national interests, public and/or private, o f those countries 
have a substantial shaie and whose head office o f manage- • 
ment and whose effective control is in one o f those 
countries can be recognized as a national line by the 
appropriate authorities o f lliose countries.
Third-country shipping line
A vessel-opeiating caiiier in its operations between two 
countiies o f which it is not a national shipping line.
Shipper
A person or entity who has entered into, or who 
demonstrates an intention to enter into, a contractual or 
other aiiangement with a conference or shipping line for 
the shipment o f gvioits in which he has a beneficial interest.
Sh ippers' organization
An association oi equivalent body which promotes, 
re[)ieseuts and piotects the inteicsts of shippers and, i f  
those uuthoiities so desire, is recognized in that capacity by 
the appropriate authority or authorities o f the country 
whose shijipeis it represents.
Goods carried by the conference
Cargo transported by shipping lines members o f a 
conference in accordance w ith the conference agreement.
Appropriate authority
Either a government or a body designated by a govern­
ment or by national legislation to perform any o f the 
functions ascribed to such authority by the provisions o f 
this Code.
Promotional freight rate *
A rate instituted for promoting the ctirriage o f non- 
traditional exports o f the country concerned.
Special freight rate
A preferential freight rate, other than a promotioiial 
freiglit rale, which may be negotiated between the parties 
concerned.
ampler I I
RELATISNS AMONG MEMBER LINES
Artic le  I  
MEMBERSHIP
1. Any national slipping line slnill have the right to be a 
fu ll member o f a conference wliich serves the foreign trade 
o f its country, subject to the criteria set out in article 1, 
paragraph 2. Shipping lines which are not national lines in 
any trade o f a conference shall have the right to become 
fu ll members o f that conference, subject to the criteria set 
out in article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, and to the provisions
'V regarding the share o f trade as set out in article 2 as regards 
third-country shipping lines.
2. A shipping line applying for membership o f a confer­
ence shall furnisli'evidence o f its ability and intention, 
which may include the use o f chartered tonnage, provided 
the criteria o f this paragraph are met, to operate a regular, 
adequate and efficient service on a long-term basis as defined 
in the conference agreentent w itliin the framework o f the 
conference, shall undertake to abide by all the terms and 
conditions o f the conference jigrecment, and shall deposit a 
financial guarantee to cover any outstanding financial 
obligation in the event o f subsequent withdrawal, sus­
pension or expulsion from membership, i f  so required 
under the conference agreement.
3. In considering an application for mcmbersliip by a 
shipping line which is not a national line in any trade o f the 
conference concerned, in addition to the provisions o f 
article I ,  paragraph 2, the following criteria, inter alia, 
sliould be taken into account:
(a) The existing volume o f the trade on the route or 
routes served by the conference and prospects for its 
growth;
(b) The adequacy o f shipping space for the existing and 
prospective volume o f trade on the route or routes served 
by the conference;
(c) The probable eflect o f admission o f the shipping line 
to the conference on the efficiency and quality o f the 
conference service;
(d) The current participation o f the shipping line in 
trade on the same route or routes outside the framework o f 
a conference; and
(e) The current participation o f the shipping line on tlie 
same route or routes within the framework o f another 
conference.
The above criteria shall not be applied so as to subvert 
the implementation o f the provisions relating to participa­
tion in trade set out in article 2.
4. An application for admission or readmission to 
membership shall be promptly decided upon and the 
decision communicated by a conference to an applicant 
promptly, and in no case later than six months from the 
date o f application. When a shipping line is refused
admission or readmission tlie conference shall,, at the same 
time, give in writing the grounds for such refusal.
5. When considering applications for admission, a con­
ference shall lake into account the views put forward by 
shijipers and shippers’ organizations o f the countries whose 
trade is carried by the conference, as well as the views o f 
appropriate authorities i f  they so request.
6. In addition to the criteria for admission set out in 
article 1, paragraph 2, a shipping line applying for re­
admission shall also give evidence o f having fulfilled its 
obligations in accordatice w ith article 4, paragraphs 1 and 4. 
The conference may give special scrutiny to the circum­
stances under which the line left the conference.
Article 2 
P A K T lC im iO N  IN TRADE
1. Any shipping line admitted to membership o f a 
conference shall have sailing and loading rights in the trades 
covered by that conference.
2. When a conference operates a po'61, all shipping lines 
ntembers o f the cotileience serving the trade covered by the 
pool sliall have the right to participate in the pool for that 
trade.
3. For the purpose o f determining the share o f trade 
which member lines shall have the right to acquire, the 
natiorral sltippittg lirres o f each country, irrespective o f the 
number o f lirres, shall be regarded as a single group o f 
shipping litres for that country.
4. Wlretr determining a share o f trade within a pool o f 
irtdividual merrrber lines and/or groups o f  rrational shipping 
lirres irr accordarrce wrilr article 2, paragraplr 2, the 
followiiig prirrciples regardirtg their right to jrarticipatioir in 
the trade carried by the conference shall be observed, unless 
otherwise mutually ugieed;
(a) lire  group o f rratiirrral shippirrg litres o f each o f two 
couirtries the foreign lt.tde between which is carried by the 
cottlcretrcc sltirll have equal rights to participate in the 
freight atrd vohtrne o f iia ffic  generated by tlreir mutual 
foreign trade arrd carried by the confereirce;
(b) 'I'hird-country shipping lines, i f  any, shall have the 
right to aaptite a sigirilicant part, such as 20 per cent, in 
the freight arrd volume o f tralfic generated by that trade.
5. II, for any orte o f the countries whose trade is carried 
by a corrieierrce, theie are no national shipping lines 
particrjrating irr the cutii.ige o f that trade, the share o f the 
trade to which natiurrul shipping lines o f that country 
would be errtitled irrrder article 2, paragraph 4 shall be 
distributed among the individual member lines participating 
in the trade in projiortion to Uieir respective share.
6. I f  the national shipping lines o f one country decide 
not to carry their fu ll sliare o f the trade, tJiat portion o f
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Uieir share o f the trade which they do not carry shall be 
distributed among the individual member lines participating 
in the trade in proportion to their respective shares.
7. I f  the national shipping lines o f the countries con­
cerned do not participate in the trade between those 
countries covered by a conference, the sltares o f trade 
carried by the conference between those countries sliall be 
allocated between the participating member lines o f th iid 
countries by commercial negotiations between those lines.
8. The national shipping lines o f a region, members o f a 
conference, at one end o f the trade covered by the 
conference, may redistribute among themselves by mutual 
agreement the sltares in trades allocated to them, in 
accordance with article 2, paragraphs 4 to 7 inclusive.
9. Subject to the provisions o f article 2, paragraphs 4 to 
8 inclusive regarding shares o f trade among individual 
shipping lines or groups o f shipping lines, pooling or 
trade-sharing agreements shall be reviewed by the confer­
ence periodically, at intervals to be stipulated in those 
agreements and in accordance with criteria to be specified 
in the conference agreement.
10. The application o f the present article shall com­
mence as soon as possible after entry into force o f the 
present Convention and shall be completed within a 
transition period which in no case shall be longer than two 
years, taking into account the specific situation in each o f 
the trades concerned.
11. Shipping lines members o f a conference shall be 
entitled to operate chartered ships to fu lfil their conference 
obligations.
12. The criteria for sharing and the revision o f shares as 
set out in article 2, paragraphs 1 to 11 inclusive shall apply 
when, in the absence o f a pool, there exists berthing, sailing 
and/or any other form o f cargo allocation agreement.
13. Where no pooling, berthing, sailing or other trade 
participation agreements exist in a conference, either group 
o f national shipping lines, members o f the conference, may 
require that pooling arrangements be introduced, in respect 
o f the trade between their countries carried by tite 
conference, in conformity with the provisions o f article 2, 
paragraph 4; or alternatively they may require that the 
sailings be so adjusted as to provide an opportunity to these 
lines to enjoy substantially the same rights to participate in 
.the trade between tliose two countries carried by the / 
conference a? they would have enjoyed under the pro­
visions o f arjicle 2, paragraph 4. Any such request shall be 
considered and decided by the conference. I f  there is no 
agreement to institute such a pool or adjustment o f sailings 
among the members o f the conference, the groups o f 
national shipping lines o f the countries at both ends o f the 
trade shall have a niajority vote in deciding to establislr such 
a pool or adjustment o f sailings. The matter shall be
decided upon within a period not exceeding six months 
from the receipt o f the request.
14. In the event o f a disagreemetU between the national 
shipping lines o f the countries at either end whose trade is 
served by tlie conference with regard to whether or not 
pooling shall be introduced, they may require that within 
the conference sailings be so adjusted as to provide an 
opportunity to these lines to enjoy substantially the same 
rights to participate in the trade between those two 
countries carried by the conference as they would have 
enjoyed under the provisions o f article 2, paragraph 4. In 
the event that there are no national shipping lines in one o f 
the countries whose trade is served by the conference, the 
national sliipping line or lines o f the other country may 
make the same reque.sl. The conference shall use its best 
endeavours to meet this request. If, however, this request is 
not met, the aijproptiale authorities o f the countries at 
both ends o f the trade may take up the matter i f  they so 
wish and make their views known to the parties concerned 
for their consideration. I f  no agreement is reached, the 
dispute sliall be dealt with in accordance w ith the pro­
cedures established in this Code.
15. Other shipping lines, members o f a conference, may 
also request that pooling or sailing agreements be intro­
duced, and the request shall be considered by the confer­
ence in accordance with the relevant provisions o f tltis 
Code.
16. A conference shall provide for appropriate measures 
in any conlerence pooling agreement to cover cases where 
the cargo has been shut out by a member line for any 
reason excepting late presentation by the sliipper. Such 
agreement sliall provide that a vessel with unbooked space, 
capable o f being used, be allowed to l if t  the cargo, even in 
excess o f the pool shaie o f the line in the trade, i f  otherwise 
the cargo would be shut out and delayed beyond a period 
set by the conference.
17. The provisioirs-of article 2, paragraphs 1 to 16 
inclusive concern all goods regardless o f their origin, their 
destination oi the use fur which they are intended, w ith the 
exception o f military equipment for national defence 
pur|ioses.
Article 3
DliClSlON-MAKlNG PROCEDURES 
_ r
The decision-making procedures embodied in a confer­
ence agreement shall lie based on the equality o f all the full 
member lines; these procedures shall ensure that, the voting 
rules do not hinder the proper work o f the conference and 
the service o f the tiade and shall define the matters on 
wh’ich decisions will be made by unanimity. However, a 
decision cannot be taken in respect ol matters defined in a 
conlerence agreement relating to the trade between two 
countries without the consent o f the national sliipping hnes 
o f those two countries.
I
Article 4 
d  SANCTIONS
1. A slapping line member o f a conference shall be 
entitled, subject to the provisions regarding withdrawal 
w liich are embodied in pool schemes and/or cargo-sharing 
arrangements, to secure its release, w itliout penalty, from 
the terms o f the conference agreement after giving three 
months’ notice, unless the conference agreement provides 
for a different time period, althougli it shall be required to 
fu lfil its obligations as a member o f the conference up to 
the date o f its releasey
2. A conference may, upon notice to be specified in the 
conference agreement, suspend or expel a member for 
significant failure to abide by the terms and conditions o f 
the conference agreement.
3. No expulsion or suspension shall become effective 
until a statement in writing o f the reasons therefor has 
been given and until any dispute has been settled as 
provided in chapter VI.
4. Upon withdrawal or expulsion, the line concerned 
shall be required to pay its share o f the outstanding 
financial obligations o f the conference, up to the date o f its 
withdrawal or expulsion. In cases o f withdrawal, suspension 
or expulsion, the line shall not be relieved o f its own 
financial obligations under the conterence agreement or o f 
any o f its obligations towards shippers.
Article 5 
SELF-POLICING
1. A conference shall adopt and keep up to date an 
illustrative list, wliich shall be as comprehensive as possible, 
o f practices wliich are regarded as malpractices and/or 
breaches o f the conference agreement and shall provide 
effective selt-policing machinery to deal w ith them, with 
specific provisions requiring:
• (a) The fixing o f penalties or a range o f penalties for 
malpractices or breaches, to be commensuiute with their 
seriousness;
(b j The examination and impartial review o f an adjudi­
cation o f complaints, and/or decisions taken on complaints, 
against malpractices or breaches, by a person or body 
unconnected with any o f the shipping lines members o f the 
conference or their affiliates, on request by the conference 
or any other party concerned;
(c) The reporting, on request, on the action taken in 
connexion with complaints against malpractices and/or 
breaches, and on a basis o f anonymity for the parties 
concerned, to the appropriate authorities o f the countries 
whose trade is served by the conference and o f the 
countries whose shipping lines are members o f the confer­
ence.
2. Shipping lines and conferences are entitled to the full 
co-operation o f shippers and shippers’ organizations in the 
endeavour to conibul malpractices and breaches.
Article 6 
CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS
All conference agreements, pooling, berthing and sailing 
rights agreements and amendments or other documents 
diiectly related to, and which affect, such agreements shall 
be made available on request to tlie appropriate authorities 
o f the countries whose tiade is served by the conference 
and o f the countries whose shipping lines are members o f 
the conference.
C hail ter I I I  
K liLA llO N S  WITH SHIPPERS
Article  7 
LOYALTY ARILANGEMENTS
1. The shipping lines members of«a conference are 
entitled to institute and maintain loyalty arrangements with 
shippers, the (oim and terms o f which are matters for 
Consultation between the conference and shippers’ organiz­
ations or representatives o f .shippers. These loyalty arrange­
ments .shall provide safeguards making exidicit the rights o f 
shippeis and cont'eience members. These arrangements shall 
be l)a.se-d on the contiaet system or any other system which 
IS also lawful.
2. Whatever loyalty airangernents are made, the freight 
rate a|)plicalile to loyal shippers shall be determined within 
a fixed range ol peicentages o f the freight rate applicable to 
other sliipjieis. Whcie a change in the differential causes an 
increase in the rales cliaiged to sliippers, the change can be 
im|)lemenled only after l.‘iO days’ notice to those sliippers 
or according to regional practice and/or agreement. Dis­
putes ill connexion with a change o f the diffeiential shall be 
settled as jiiuvided in the loyalty agreement.
3. The terms ol loyally arrangements shall provide 
safeguaids making explicit the rights and obligations o f 
shippeis and ofsliip |in ig lines members o f the conference in 
accoidance with the following provisions,//i/eru/w:
(a) The shipjrer shall be bound in respect o f cargo whose 
shijnnent is controlled by him or his affiliated or subsidiary 
company or his foiwarding agent in accordance with the 
conliact o f sale o f the goods concerned, jrrovided that the 
shipper shall not, by evasion, subterfuge, or intermediary, 
attempt to divert cargo in violation o f his loyalty commit­
ment;
(b) Wheie there is a loyalty contract, the extent o f 
actual or liquidated damages and/or penalty shall be 
S]>ecified in the contract. The member lines o f the 
conference may. however, decide to assess lower liquidated 
damages or to waive the claim to liquidated damages. In
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any event, the liquidated damages under tlie contract to be 
paid by the shipper shall not exceed the freight charges on 
tiie particular shipment, computed at the rate provided 
under the contract;
(c) The shipper shall be entitled to resume fu ll loyally 
status, subject to the fulfilment o f conditions established 
by the conference which shall be specified in the loyally 
arrangement;
(d) The loyalty arrangement shall set out:
( i)  A list o f cargo, which may include bulk cargo 
shipfied without mark or count, which is specifically 
excluded from the scope o f the loyalty arrange­
ment;
( ii)  A definition o f the circumstances in which cargo 
other than cargo covered by (i) above is considered 
to be excluded from the scope o f the loyalty 
arrangement;
(Hi) The inelhod o f settlement o f disputes arising under 
the loyally arrangement;
(iv) Provision for termination o f the loyalty arrangement 
on request by either a shipper or a conference 
without penalty, after expiry o f a stipulated period 
o f notice, such notice to be given in writing; and 
. (v) The terms for granting dispensation.
4. I f  there is a dispute between a conference and a 
sliippers’ organization, representatives o f shippers and/or 
shippers about the form or terms o f a proposed loyally 
arrangement, either party may refer the matter fo r reso- 
■ lution under appropriate procedures as set out in tlusCode.
Article 8 
DISPENSATION
1. Conferences shall provide, w ithin the terms o f the 
loyalty arrangements, that requests by shippers for dis()cn- 
sation shall be examined and a decision given quickly and, 
i f  requested, the reasons given in writing where dispensation 
is witliheld. Should a conference fail to confinn, w ithin a 
period specified in the loyalty arrangement, sufficient space 
to accommodate a shipper’s cargo w itliin  a period also 
specified in the loyalty arrangement, the shipper siiall have 
.the right, without being penalized, to utilize any vessel lor 
the cargo in t)uestion.
2 . In ports where conference services are arranged 
subject to the availability o f a specified minimum ol cargo 
(i.e. on inducement), but either the shipjnng line does not 
call, despite due notice by shippers, or the shipping line 
does not reply w ithin an agreed time to the notice given by 
shippers, shippers shall automatically have the right, w ith­
out prejudicing their loyalty status, to use any available 
vessel for the carriage o f their cargo.
Article 9
AVAILAB ILITY  OF TARIFFS AND RELATED 
CONDITIONS AND/OR REGULATIONS
Tariffs, related conditions, regulations, and any amend­
ments tliereto sliall be made available on request to
shippers, shippers’ organizations and other parties concerned 
at reasonable cost, and they sliall be available for examina­
tion at offices o f shipping lines and their agents. They shall 
spell out all conditions concerning the application o f freight 
rales and the carriage o f any cargo covered by them.
Article 10 
ANNUAL REPORTS
Conferences shall provide annually to shipper’ organiz­
ations, or to representatives o f shippers, reports on their 
activities designed to provide general infonnation o f 
interest to them, including relevant information about 
consultations held with shippers and shippers’ organiz­
ations, action taken regarding complaints, changes in 
membership, and significant changes in service, tariffs and 
conditions o f cairiage. Such annual reports sliall be submit- ' 
ted, on request, to the appropriate authorities o f the 
countries whose trade is served by the conference con­
cerned.
Article 11 •*
CONSULTATION MACHINERY
1. There shall be consultations on matters o f common 
interest between a conference, shippers’ organizations, 
representatives o f shippers and, where practicable, shippers, 
which may be designated for that purpose by the appro­
priate aulho iily  i f  it so desires. These consultations shall 
take place whenevei requested by any o f the above- 
mentioned parlies. Appropriate authorities shall have the 
right, upon lequest, to participate fu lly in the consulta­
tions, but this does not mean that they play a decision­
making lole.
2. I'he following matters, inter alia, may be the subject 
o f consultation;
(a) Changes in general ta riff conditions and related 
regulations;
(h) Changes in the general level o f ta riff rates and rates 
for major commodities;
(c j Promotional and/or special Ireight rates;
(d) Imposition of, and related changes in, surcharges;
(e} Loyalty airangements, their establishment or changes 
in their form and general conditions;
(J'J Changes in the ta riff classification o f ports; ■
(g) Procedure lo i the supply o f necessary information 
by shijipeis conccinlng the expected volume and nature o f 
then caigoes; and
( li)  Presentation o f cargo for shipment and the require­
ments regarding notice o f cargo availability.
3. To the extent that they fall within the scope o f 
activity o f a confcience, the following matters may also be 
the subject ol consultation;
(a) Operation o f cargo inspection services;
(b j Changes in Uje pattern o f services;
(c) Effects o f the introduction o f new technology in the 
carriage o f cargo, in particular unitization, with consequent 
reduction o f conventional service or loss o f direct services; 
and
(d) Adequacy and quality o f sliipping services, including 
the impact o f pooling, berthing or sailing arrangements on 
the availability o f shipping services and freight rates at 
which shipping services are provided; changes in the areas 
served and in the regularity o f calls by conference vessels.
4. Consultations shall be held before final decisions are 
taken, unless otherwise provided in this Code. Advance 
notice shall be given o f the intention to take decisions on 
matters referred to in article 11, paragraphs 2 and 3. Where 
tliis is impossible, urgent decisions may be taken pending 
the holding o f consultations.
5. Consultations sliall begin without undue delay and in 
any event within a maximum period specified in tlie 
conference agreement or, in the absence o f such a provision 
in the agreement, not later than 30 days after receipt o f the 
proposal for consultations, unless different periods o f time 
are provided in this Code.
6. When holding consultations, the parties .shall use their 
best efforts to provide relevant information, to hold timely 
discussions and to clarify matters for the purpose o f seeking 
solutions o f the issues concerned. The parties involved shall 
take account o f each other’s views and problems :uid strive 
to reach agreement consistent with their commercial 
viability.
Chapter JV 
FREIGHT RATES
Article 12
CRITERIA FOR FREIGHT-RATE DETERMINATION
In arriving at a decision on questions o f ta riff policy in 
all cases mentioned in this Code, the following promts shall, 
unless otlierwise provided, be taken into account:
(a) Freiglit rates shall be fixed at as low a level as is 
feasible from the commercial point o f view and shall permit 
a reasonable profit for sliipowiiers;
(b) The cost o f operations o f conferences shall, as a rule, 
be evaluated for the round voyage o f ships, with the 
outward and inward directions considered as a single whole. 
Where applicable, the outward and inward voyage should be 
considered separately. The freight rales should take into 
account, among other factors, the nature o f cargoes, the 
interrelation between weight ^and cargo measurement, as 
well as the value o f cargoes;
(c) In fixing promotional freiglit rates and/or special 
freight rates for specific goods, the conditions o f trade lor 
these goods o f llie countries served by the conference.
particularly o f developing and land-locked countries, shall 
be taken into account.
Article 13
CONFERENCE TARIFFS AND CLASSIFICATION 
OF TARIFF RATES
1. Conference tariffs shall not unfairly differentiate 
between shippers similarly situated. Shipping lines members 
o f a conference shall adhere strictly to the rates, rules and 
terms shown in the tariffs and other currently valid , 
published documents o f the conference and to any special 
arrangements permitted under this Code.
2 . Conference tariffs should be drawn up simply and 
clearly, containing as few classes/categories as possible, 
depending on the commodity and, where appropriate, for 
each class/calegory; they should also indicate, wherever 
practicable, in order to facilitate statistical compilation and 
analysis, the corresponding appropriate code number o f the 
item in accordance with the Standard International Trade 
Classification, the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature or any 
other nomenclaluie that may be internationally adopted; 
the classification o f commodities in thejariffs should, as far 
as practicable, be prepared in co-operation w ith shippers’ 
organizations and other national and international organiz­
ations concerned.
Article 14
GENERAL FREIGHT-RATE INCREASES
1. A conference shall give notice o f not less than 150 
days, or according to regional practice and/or agreement, to 
slnpirers’ organizations or representatives o f shippers and/or 
ship|)ers and, where so required, to appropriate authorities 
o f the countries whose trade is served by the conlerence, o f 
its intention to effect a general increase in freight rates, an 
indication o f its extent, the date o f effect and the reasons 
supporting the proposed increase.
2. At the request o f any o f the parties prescribed for this 
purpose in this Code, to be made w ithin an agreed period o f 
lime after the receipt o f the notice, consultations sliall 
commence, in accordance w itli the relevant provisions o f 
this Code, w ithin a stipulated period not exceeding 30 days 
or as previously agreed between the parties concerned; the 
consultations shall be held in respect o f the bases and 
amounts o f the inoposed increase and the date Irom which 
it is to be given effect.
3. A conlerence, in an effort to expedite consultations, 
may or upon the request o f any ol the parties prescribed in 
this Caide as entitled to participate in consultations on 
geiteial freight-rate increases shall, where practicable., 
reasonably before the consultations, submit to the partici­
pating parlies a report from independent accountants o f 
repute, includirtg, where the requesting parties accept it  as 
one o f the bases o f coirsultations, an aggregated analysis o f
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data regarding«relevant costs and revenues which in the 
opinion o f the conference necessitate an increase in freight 
rales.
4. I f  agreement is reached as a result o f the consulta­
tions, the freight-rate increase shall take effect from the 
dale indicated ,in the notice served in accordance with 
article 14, paragraph 1, unless a later date is agreed upon 
between the parties concerned.
5. I f  no agreement is reached w ithin 30 days o f the 
giving o f notice m accordance with article 14, paragraph 1, 
and subject to procedures prescribed in tliis Code, the 
matter shall be submitted immediately to international 
mandatory conciliation, in accordance with chapter V I. The 
recommendation of the conciliators, i f  accepted by the 
parties concerried, shall be binding upon them and shall be 
implemented, subject to the provisions o f article 14, 
paragraph 9, with effect from ifie date mentioned in the 
conciliators’ reconunendation.
6. Subject to the provisions o f article 14, paragraph 9, a 
general freiglit-rate increase may be implemented by a 
conference pending the conciliators recoinmendaiiQii. 
When making their reconunendation, the conciliators 
should take into account the extent o f the above- 
mentioned increase made by the conference and the jreriod 
for which it has been in force. In the event that the 
conference rejects the recommendation o f the conciliators, 
shippers and/or shippers’ organizations shall have the right 
to consider themselves not bound, alter appropriate notice, 
by any arrangement or other contract with that conference 
which may prevent them from using non-conference ship­
ping lines. Where a loyalty arrangement exists, shippers 
and/or sliippers’ organizations shall give notice within a 
period o f 30 days to the effect that they no longer consider 
themselves bound by that arrangement, which notice shall 
apply from the date mentioned therein, and a period o f not 
less than 30 days and not more than 90 days shall be 
provided in the loyalty arrangement for this purpose.
7. A  deferred rebate which is due to the shipper and 
■ which has already been accumulated by the conference
sliall not be withheld by, or forfeited to, the conference as 
a result o f action by the shipper under article 14, para­
graph 6.
8. I f  the trade o f a country carried by shipping lines 
members o f a conference on a particular route consists 
largely o f one or few basic commodities, any increase in the 
freight rate on one or more o f those commodities shall be 
treated as a general freight-rate increase, and the appio- 
priate provisions o f tlus Code sliall apply.
9. Conferences should institute any general freight-rale 
• increase effective in accordance with this Code for a period
o f a slated minimum duration, subject always to the rules 
regarding surcharges and regarding adjustment in Ireight 
rates consetiuenl upon lluctuaiions in foreign exchange 
rates. The period over which a general Ireight-rale increase 
is to apply is an appropriate matter to be considered during
consultations conducted in accordance w ith article 14, 
paragiaph 2. but unless otherwise agreed between the 
parties concerned dining the consultations, the minimum 
period oi time between tlie date when one general 
freight-rate increase becomes effective and the date o f 
notice for the next general freight-rate increase given in 
accordance with article 14, paragraph 1 shall not be less 
than 10 months.
Article 15 
PROMOTIONAL FREIGHT RATES
1. Promotional freight rates for non-traditional exports 
should be instituted by conferences.
2. A ll necessary and reasonable information justifying 
the need for a promotional freight rate shall be submitted' 
to a conference by the shippers, sliippers’ organizations or 
representatives o f shippers concerned.
3. Special jirocedures shall be instituted providing for a 
decision w ithin 30 days from the date o f receipt o f that • 
information, unless mutually agreiyl otherwise, on applica­
tions for promotional freight rates. A clear distinction shall 
be made between these and general procedures for consider­
ing the possibility o f reducing freight rates for other 
commodities or o f exempting them from increases.
4 . Information regarding the procedures for considering 
applications for promotional freight rates shall be made 
available by the confeience to sliippers and/or shippers 
organizations and, on request, to the Governments and/or 
other appropriate aulhorities o f the countries whose trade 
is served by the conference.
5. A promotional freight rate shall be established nor­
mally for a period o f 12 months, unless otherwise mutually 
agreed between the parties concerned. Prior to tlie expiry 
o f the period, the promotional freight rate shall be 
reviewed, on request by the shippei and/or shippers’ 
organization concerned, when it shall be a mailer fo r the 
shipper and/or shippers’ organization, at the request o f the 
conference, to show tliat the continuation o f the rate is 
justified beyond the initial period.
6. When examining a request for a promotional freight 
rate, the conference may take into account that, while the 
rate should promote the export o f the non-traditional 
product for which it is souglit, it is not likely to create 
substantial competitive distortions in the export of a similar 
product fiom  another country served by the conference.
7. Promol ional freight rates are not excluded from thi 
imposition o f a surcharge or a currency adjustment facto 
in accordance with articles 16 and 17.
8. Each shipping line member o f a conference servini 
the relevant polls o f a conference trade shall accept, am 
not unreasonably icfuse, a fair share o f cargo for which 
promotionaf freight rate has been established by th 
conrercnce.
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Article 16 
® SURCHARGES
1. Surcharges imposed by a conference to cover sudden 
or extraordinary increases in costs or losses o f revenue shall 
be regarded as, temporary. They shall be reduced in 
accordance with improvements in the situation or circum­
stances wliich tliey were imposed to meet and shall be 
cancelled, subject to article 16, paragraph 6, as soon as the 
situation or circumstances which prompted their imposition 
cease to prevail. This shall be indicated at the moment o f 
their imposition, together, as far as possible, with a 
description o f the change in the situation or circumstances 
which w ill bring about their increase, reduction or cancel­
lation.
2. Surcharges imposed on cargo moving to or from a 
particular port shall likewise be regarded as temporary and 
likewise shall be increased, reduced or cancelled, subject to 
article 16, paragraph 6, when the situation in that port 
changes.
3. Before any surcharge is imposed, whether general or 
covering only a specific port, notice should be given and 
there shall be consultation, upon request, in accordance 
with tlie procedures o f this Code, between the conference 
concerned and other parties directly affected by tlie 
surcharge and prescribed in this Code as entitled to 
participate in such consultations, save in those exceptional 
circumstances which warrant immediate imposition o f the 
surcharge. In cases where a surcharge has been imposed 
without prior consultation, consultations, upon request, 
shall be held as soon as possible thereafter. Prior to such 
consultations, conferences shall furnish data which in their 
opinion justify the imposition o f the surcharge.
4. Unless the parties agree otherwise, within a period o f 
15 days after the receipt o f a notice given in accordance 
with article 16, paragraph 3, i f  there is no agreement on the 
question o f the surcharge between the parties concerned 
referred to in that article, the relevant provisions for 
settlement o f disputes provided in this Code sliall prevail. 
Unless the parties concerned agree otherwise, the surcharge 
may, however, be imposed pending resolution o f the 
dispute, i f  the dispute still remains unresolved at the end o f 
a period o f 30 days after the receipt o f the above- 
mentioned notice.
5. In the event o f a surcharge being imposed, in 
exceptional circumstances, without prior consultation as 
provided in article 16, paragraph 3, i f  no agreement is 
reached through subsequent consultations, the relevant 
provisions for settlement o f disputes provided in this Code 
shall prevail.
6. Financial loss incurred by the shipping lines members 
o f a conference as a result o f any delay on account o f 
consultations and/or other proceedings for resolving 
disputes regarding imposition o f surcharges in accordance
with the provisions ol' this Code, as compared to the date 
Irom which the surcharge was to be imposed in terms o f the 
notice given in accordance with article 16, paragraph 3, 
may be com|>en.saled by an equivalent prolongation o f tlie 
surcharge before its removal. Conversely, for any surcharge 
imposed by the conleieiice and subseijuently determined 
and agreed to he unjustified or excessive as a result o f 
consultations oi other procedures prescribed in this Code, 
the amounts so collected or the excess thereof as deter­
mined hereinabove, unless otherwise agreed, shall be re­
funded to the parlies concerned, i f  claimed by them, w itliin  
a period ol 30 days o f such claim.
Article 17 
CURKIiNCY CHANGES
1. lixchange late cli.mg(;s, including formal devaluation 
or revaluation, which lead to changes in the aggregate 
operational costs and/oi levenues o f the shipping lines 
inemheis o f a coideience lelaiing to their operations within 
the conleience piovide a valid reason for the introduction 
o f a currency ail|usiment factor or J'or a change in the 
fieight rates. The adjustment or change sliall be such that in 
the aggiegate the memliei lines concerned neither gain nor 
lose, as far as possible, as a result o f the adjustment or 
change. 1'he adjustment or change may lake the form o f 
currency surcharges oi discounts or o f increases or de­
creases in the I'reight rales.
2. Such adjustments or changes shall be subject to 
notice, which should be arranged in accordance w ith 
regional practice, where such practice exists, and there shall 
be consultations in accoidance with the provisions o f this 
Code between the conference concerned and the other 
parties directly alTecled and prescribed in this Code as 
entitled to particijiaie in consultations, save in those 
exceptional circumstances which warrant immediate impo­
sition o f the currency adjustment factor or freight-rate 
change. In the event that this has been done without prior 
consultations, consultations shall be held as soon as possible 
thereafter. The consullations should be on the application, 
size and dale o f imjilemenlation o f the currency adjustment 
factor or Ireighl-rate change, and the same procedures shall 
be followed for this purpose as are prescribed in article 16, 
paragraphs 4 and 5, in resjiect o f surcharges. Such consulta­
tions should lake place and be completed within a period 
not exceeding 15 days from the dale when the intention to 
ap))ly a currency suicharge-or to effect a freight-rate change 
is announced.
3. I f  no agreement is reached within 15 days through 
con.sultations, the relevant provisions for settlement o f 
disputes provided in this Code sliall prevail.
4. The provisions o f article 16, paragraph 6 shall apply, 
adapted as necessary to currency adjustment factors and 
freight-rale changes dealt with in the present article.
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Chapter V 
OTHER MATTERS
Article 18 
FIGHTING SHIPS
Members o f a conference shall not use figlrting ships in 
the conference trade for the purpose o f excluding, prevent­
ing or reducing competition by driving a shipping line not a 
member o f the conference out o f the said trade.
Article 19 
ADEQUACY OF SERVICE
1. Conferences should take necessary and appropriate 
measures to ensure that their member lines provide regular, 
adequate and efficient service o f the required frequency on 
the routes they serve and shall arrange such services so as to 
avoid as far as possible bunching and gapping o f sailings. 
Conferences should also take into consideration any special 
measures necessary in arranging services to handle seasonal 
variations in cargo volumes.
2. Conferences and other parties prescribed in this Code 
as entitled to participate in consultations, includitig appro­
priate autliorities i f  they so desire, should keep under 
review, and sliould maintain close co-operation regarding 
the demand for shipping space, the adequacy and suitability 
o f service, and in particular tire possibilities for rationaliz­
ation and for increasing the efficiency o f services. Benefits 
identified as accruing from rationalization o f seivices shall 
be fairly reflected in the level o f freight rates.
3. In respect o f any port for which conference services 
are supplied only subject to the availability o f a specified 
minimum o f cargo, that minimum sliall be specified in the 
tariff. Shippers sliould give adequate notice o f the avail­
ability o f such cargo.
Article 20 
HEAD OFFICE OF A CONFERENCE
A conference shall as a rule establisli its head office in a 
country whose trade is served by that conference, unless 
agreed otherwise by the shipping lines members o f that 
conference.
Article 21 
REPRESENTATION
Conferences shall establish local representation in all 
countries served, except that where there are practical 
reasons to the. contrary the representation may be on a 
regional basis. The naifies and addresses o f representatives 
shall be readily available, and these representatives shall 
ensure that the views o f sliippers and conferences are made
rapidly known to each other with a view to expediting 
prompt decisions. When a conference considers it  suitable, 
it shall provide for adequate delegation o f powers o f 
decision to its representatives.
Article 22
CONTENTS OF CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS, 
TRADE PAR'TICIPATION AGREEMENTS 
AND LOYALTY ARRANGEMENTS
Conference agreements, trade participation agreements 
and loyalty arrangements shall conform to the applicable 
rei|uirements o f this Code and may include such other 
provisions as may be agreed which are not inconsistent w ith 
this Code.
Part two 
Chapter VI
PROVISIONS AND MACHINERY FOR SETTLEMENT 
OF DISPUTES
•«
A. U l'N l'R A L PROVISIONS 
Article 23
1. The (irovisions o f this chapter shall apply whenever 
theie is a dispute relating to the application or operation o f 
the piovisions o f this Code hetween the following parties:
(a) A conference and a .shipping line;
(b j The shipping lines ineinhers o f a conference;
(c j A conference or a sliipping line member thereof and 
a shippers’ oigani/.ation oi lepicsentatives o f shippers or 
sliip|)ers; and
(d) Two or more confemices.
For the purposes ol this chapter the term “ party”  means 
the oiiginal patties to the disjuite us well as third parties 
which have joined tlie proceedings in accordance with (a) o f 
article 34.
2. Disputes between shijipiiig lines o f the same Hag, as 
well as those between oigani/ulions belonging to the same 
country,shall he seiileil within the framework o f the national 
jurisdiction o f that eoiiiitiy , unless this creates serious 
dilficulties in the fu llihneiit o l'tlie  provisions o f this Code.
3. T'he paities to a dispute shall first attempt to settle it 
by an exchange o f views or direct negotiations with the 
iiitention o f finding a mutually satisfactory solution.
4. Disputes between the parties referred to in aiticle 23, 
paragraph I relating to;
(a) Refusal o f adniission o f a national shipping line to a 
conference serving the foreign trade o f the country o f that 
shipping line;
(b )  Refusal o f admission o f a third-country shipping line 
to a conference; s
(c j Expulsion from a conference;
( d )  Inconsistency o f a conference agreement with this 
Code;
(e) A general freiglit-rate increase;
( f )  Surcharges;
(g) Changes in freight rates or the imposition o f a 
currency adjustment factor due to exchange rate changes;
(h) Participation in trade; and
( i)  The form and terms o f proposed loyalty 
arrangements
which have not been resolved througli an exchange o f views 
or direct negotiations shall, at the request o f any o f the 
parties to the dispute, be referred to international 
mandatory conciliation in accordance w itli the provisions 
o f this chapter.
Artic le  24
1. The conciliation procedure is initiated at the request 
o f one o f tlie parties to the dispute.
2. The request shall be made:
(a j In disputes relating to membership o f conferences: 
not later than 60 days from the date o f receipt by the 
applicant o f the conference decision, including tlie reasons 
therefor, in accordance with article 1, paragraph 4 and 
article 4, paragraph 3;
(b j In disputes relating to general freight-rate increases: 
not later than the dale o f expiry o f the period o f notice 
specified in article 14, paragrapli 1;
(c) In disputes relating to suicharges: not later than the 
date o f expiry o f the 30-day period specified in article 16, 
paragraph 4 or, where no notice has been given, not later 
than 15 days from the date when the surcharge was put 
into effect; and
(d) In disputes relating to changes in freight rates or the 
imposition o f a currency adjustment factor due to exchairge 
rate changes: not later than five days after the date o f 
expiry o f the period specified in article 17, paragraph 3.
3. The provisions o f article 24, paragraph 2 shall not 
apply to a dispute wliich is referred to international 
mandatory conciliation in accordance with article 25, 
paragraph 3.
4. Requests for conciliation in disputes other than 
those referred to in article 24, paragraph 2, may be made at 
any time.
5. The time-limits specified in article 24, paragraph 2 
may be extended by agreement between the parties.
6. A request for conciliation shall be considered to have 
been duly made i f  it is proved that the request has been
sent to the other party by registered letter, telegram or 
telcpiinter or has been reived on it within the time-limits 
specified in arttcle 24, paiiigiuphs 2 or 5.
7. Where no request has been made within tire 
linre-liinils specified in at tide 24, paragraphs 2 or 5, the 
decision o f tlie confeience shall be final and no proceedings 
under this chaplet may he brought by any party to the 
dispute to challenge that decision.
Article 25
1. Where the parties have agreed that disputes referred 
to in article 23, paragraph 4 (a), (b), (cj, (d), (h) and (i)  
shall be resolved through procedures other than those 
established in that article, or agree on procedures to resolve 
a particular dispute that has arisen between them, such 
disputes shall, at the request o f any o f the parties to tire 
dispute, be resolved as provided for in their agreement.
2. The provisions o f article 25, paragraph 1 apply also to 
the disputes referred to in article 23, paragraph 4 (cj, ( f)  
and (g), unless national legislation, rules or regulations 
prevent shippers from having this freedoyr o f choice.
3. Where conciliation proceedings have been initiated, 
such proceedings shall have precedence over remedies 
available under national law. I f  a party seeks remedies 
under national law in respect o f a dispute to which this 
chaptei applies without invoking the procedures provided 
for in this chapter, then, upon the request o f a respondent 
to those proceedings, they shall be stayed and the dispute 
shall be referred to the procedures defined in this chapter 
by the court or other authority wliere the national remedies 
are sought.
Article 26
1. The Contracting Parties shall confer upon conferences 
and shippers’ organixations such capacity as is necessary for 
the application o f the provisions o f this chapter. In 
particular:
(aj A conference or a sliippers’ organization may 
institute proceedings as a party or be named as a party to 
proceedings in its collective capacity;
(b j Any notification to a conference or shippers’ 
organization in its collective capacity shall also coirstilute a 
notification to each member o f such conference or 
shippers’ organi/alion;
(c j A notification to a conference or shippers’ 
organization shall be transmitted to the address o f the head 
office o f the conference or shippers’ organization. Each 
conference or shippers’ organization shall register the 
address o f its head office with the Registrar appointed in 
accordance with article 46, paragraph 1. In the event that 
a conference or a shippers’ organization fails to register or 
has no head office, a notification to any member in the 
name o f the conference or shippers’ organization shall be
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deemed to be a notification to such conference or 
organization.
2. Acceptance or rejection by a conference or shippers’ 
organization o f a recommendation by conciliators shall be 
deemed to be acceptance or rejection o f such a 
recommendation by each member thereof.
Article 27
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the conciliators may 
decide to make a recommendation on the basis o f written 
submissions without oral proceedings.
B. INTERNATIONAL MANDATORY CONCILIATION
Article 28
In international mandatory conciliation the aiipropriatc 
authorities o f a Contiacling Party shall, i f  they so request, 
participate in the conciliation proceedings in support o f a 
party being a national o f that Contracting Party, or in 
support o f a party having a dispute arising in the context o f 
the foreign trade o f that Contracting Party. The appropriate 
authority may alternatively act as an observer in such 
conciliation proceedings.
Article 29
1. In international mandatory conciliation the 
proceedings shall be held in the place unanimously agreed 
to by the parties or, failing such agreement, in the place 
decided upon by the conciliators.
2. In determining the place o f conciliation proceedings 
the parties and the conciliators shall take into account, 
inter alia, countries which are closely connected with the 
dispute, bearing in mind the country o f the shipping line 
concerned and, especially when the dispute is related to 
cargo, the country where the cargo originates.
Article 30
1. For the purposes o f this chapter an international 
panel o f conciliators shall be established, con.sisting o f 
experts o f high repute or experience in the fields o f law, 
economics o f sea transport, or foreign trade and finance, as 
determined by the Contracting Parties selecting them, who 
shall serve in an independent capacity.
2. Each Contracting Party may at any time nominate 
members o f the panel up to a total o f 12, and shall 
communicate their names to the Registrar. The 
nominations shall be for periods o f six years each and may 
be renewed. In the event o f the death, incapiicity or 
resignation o f a member o f the panel, the Contracting Party 
which nominated such person shall nominate a replacement
fur the remainder o f his teim o f office. A nomination takes 
effect liom  the date on which the communication o f the 
nomination is received by the Registrar.
3. 1'he Registrar shall maintain the panel list and shall 
regularly inform the Contracting Parties o f the composition 
o fihe jtanel.
Article 31
1. The purpose o f conciliation is to reach an amicable 
settlement o f the dispute througli recommendations 
formulated by independent conciliators.
2. The conciliatois .shall tdenlify and clarify the issues in 
dispute, seek for this purpose any information from the 
parties, aitd oit the basis thereof, submit to the parties a 
recorrtrrterrditliitrr for lire selllertrerit o f the disjrute.
.1. The parlies shall cooperate in good faith with the 
conciliators itt order lit ert.ilile them to carry out their 
futtcitons.
4. .Subject to the provisions o f article«25, paragraph 2, 
the parlies to the dispute ittay at any time durirtg the 
currciliatton |)toceedittgs decide in agreement to have 
recoitrse to a different irtoceditre for the settlement o f their 
disjrute. The parlies to a dispute which has been made 
subject to proceedings other than those provided tor in this 
chapter may decide by mulital agreement to have recourse 
to interrralional niandrrtory corrciliation.
Article 32
1. The corrciliation proceedings shall be conducted 
either by orte conciliator or by an uiteven number o f 
conciliators agreed upon or designated by the parties.
2. Where the parties canrrot agree on the number or the 
appointrncrrt o f the conciliators as provided in article 32, 
paragraph 1, the conciliation proceedings shall be 
conducted by three conciliators, one appointed by each 
party in the staiemenl(s) o f claim and reply respectively; 
aitd the third by the two cotrcilialors thus appoirrted, who 
shall act as chairrnart.
3. I f  the reply does rrol rtatne a corrciliator to be 
itppointed hr cases where article 32, paragraph 2 would 
apply, the securtd corrcilfator shall, w ithin 30 days 
followirtg the receipt o f the statement o f claim, be chosen 
by lot by the corrciliator appointed in the statement o f 
claim from among the nternbets o f tire panel nominated by 
the Contracting Party or Parties o f wliich the respondent(s) 
is(are) a nationalfs).
4. Where the conciliators appointed in accordance with 
article 32, paragraphs 2 or 3 cannot agree oir the 
appoirrtment o f the third conciliator within 15 days 
following the date o f the appointment o f the second
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conciliator, he shall, within the following 5 days, be chosen 
by lot by tlie appointed conciliators. Prior to the drawing 
by lot:
(a j No member o f the panel o f conciliators having the 
same nationality as either o f the two appointed conciliators 
shall be eligible for selection by lot;
(b) Each o f the two appointed conciliators may exclude 
from the list o f the panel o f conciliators an equal number 
o f them subject to the requirement that at least 30 
members o f the panel shall remain eligible for selection bv 
lot.
Article 33
1. Where several parties request conciliation with the 
same respondent in respect o f the same issue, or o f issues 
which are closely connected, that respondent may request 
tire consolidation o f those cases.
2. The request for consolidation shall be considered and 
decided upon by majority vote by the chainvien o f the 
conciliators so lar chosen. I f  such request is allowed, the 
chairmen will designate the conciliators to consider the 
consolidated cases from among the conciliators so far 
appointed or chosen, provided that an uneven number o f 
conciliators is chosen and that the conciliator llrsi 
appointed by each party shall be one ol the conciliators 
considering the consolidated case.
Article 34
Any party, other than an appropriate authority referred 
to in article 28, i l  conciliation has been initiated, may join 
in the proceedings:
either
(a) As a party, in case o f a direct economic interest; 
or
(b j As a supporting party to one o f the original parties, 
in case o f an indirect economic interest,
unless either o f the original parties objects to such joinder.
Article 35
1. The recommendations o f the conciliators shall be 
made in accordance with the provisions o f this Code.
2. When the- Code is silent upon any point, the concili­
ators shall apply the law which the parties agree at the time 
the conciliation proceedings commence or thereafter, but 
not later than the time o f submission o f evidence to the 
conciliators, hailing such agreement, the law which in the 
opinion ol the conciliators is most closely connected with 
the dispute shall be applicable.
3. The conciliators shall not decide ex aequo et bono 
upon the dispute unless the parties so agree after the 
dispute has arisen.
4. The conciliators shall not bring a finding o f non liquet 
on the ground o f obscurity o f the law.
5. The conciliators may recommeiid those remedies and 
reliefs which are provided in the law applicable to the 
dispute.
Article 36
The recommendations o f the conciliators shall include 
reasons.
Article 37
1. Unless the parties have agreed before, during or after 
the conciliation procedure that the recommendation o f the 
conciliators shall be binding, the recommendation shall 
become binding by acceptance by the parties. A reconmien- 
dation which has been accepted by some parties to a 
dispute shall be binding as between those j)arties only.
2. Acceptance o f the recommendalion must be com- 
muiucated by the parties to the conciliators, at an address 
specilied by them, not later than 30 days alter receipt o f 
the nolilica lio ii ol the recommendation; otlicrwise, i t  shall 
be considered that the recommendation has not been 
accepted.
3. Any party which does not accept the reconunen- 
dalion shall notify the conciliators and the other parties, 
within 30 days following the period specified in article 37, 
paragraph 2 ol its grounds for rejection o f the recommen­
dation, cominehcnsively and in writing.
4. When the recommendation has been accepted by the 
parlies, the conciliators shall immediately draw up and sign 
a record ol settlement, at which time the recommendation 
shall become binding upon those parties.ilf the recommen­
dalion has not lieen accepted by all parties, the conciUators 
shall diaw up a lepoii with respect to those parties rejecting 
the recommendalion, iioimg the dispute and the failure of 
those parties to settle the dispute.
.S. A recommendation which has become binding upon 
the |)aities shall be implemented by them immediately or at 
such later lime as is specified in the recommendation.
(). Any party may make its acceptance conditional upon 
acce|)tance by all or any o f the other parties to the dispute.
Article 38
I. A recommenilalion shall constitute a final dctermina- 
tio ii ol a dispute as between the parties which accept it, 
except to the extent that the recommendalion is not 
recogni/.ed and enlorced in accordance w ith the provisions 
ol article 39.
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2. “ Recommendation”  includes an interpretation, clari­
fication or revSion o f the recommendation made by the 
conciliators before the recommendation has been accepted.
Article 39
1. Each Contracting Party shall recognize a recommen­
dation as binding between the parties which have accepted 
it  and shall, subject to the provisions o f article 39, 
paragraphs 2 and 3, enforce, at the request o f any sucli 
party, all obligations imposed by the recommendation as if  
it were a final judgement o f a court o f that Contracting 
Party.
2. A recommendation shall not be recognized and 
enforced at the request o f a party referred to in article 39, 
paragraph 1 oidy i f  the court or other competent authority 
o f the country where recognition and enforcement is 
sought is satisfied that;
(a} Any party which accepted the recommendation was, 
under the law applicable to it, under some legal incapacity 
at the time o f acceptance;
(b ) Fraud or coercion has been used in the making of 
the recommendations;
(c) The recommendation is contrary to public policy 
(ordre public) in the country o f enforcement; or
(d) The composition o f the conciliators, or the concili­
ation procedure, was not in accordance with the provisions 
o f tliis Code.
3. Any part o f the recommendation shall not be 
enforced and recognized i f  the court or other competent 
authority is satisfied that such part comes within ;uiy o f the 
subparagraphs o f article 39, paragraph 2 and can be 
separated from other parts o f the recommendation. I f  such 
part cannot be separated, the entire recommendation sliall 
not be enforced and recognized.
Article 40
1. Where the recommendation has been accepted by all 
the parties, the recommendation and the reasons therelor 
may be published with the consent o f all the parties.
2. Where the recommendation has been rejected by one 
or more ol the parties but has been accepted by one or 
more o f the parties:
(a) The party or parties rejecting the recommendation 
shall publish its or their grounds for rejection, given 
pursuant to article 37, paragraph 3, and may at the same 
time publish the recommendation and the reasons therelor;
(b) A  party which has accepted tlie recommendation 
may publish the recommendation and the reasons therelor; 
it may also publish the grounds for rejection given by any 
other party unless such other party has already published 
its rejection and the grounds therelor in accordance with 
article 40, paragraph 2 (a).
3. Where the recommendation has not been accepted by 
any o f the parties, each party may publish the recommen­
dation and tlie reasons therefor and also its own rejection 
and the grounds therefor.
Article 41
1. Docunrents and statements containing factual infor­
mation supplied by any party to the conciliators shall be 
made public unless that party or a majority o f the 
conciliators agrees otherwise.
2. Such documents and statements supplied by a party 
may be tendered by that party in support o f its case in 
subsequent proceedings arising from tire same dispute and 
between the same parties.
Article 42
Where the recommendation has not become binding 
upon the parties, no views expressed or reasons given by the 
conciliators, or concessions or offers made by the parties 
for the purpose o f the conciliation_^procedure, shall affect 
ihe legal rights and obligations o f any of the parties.
Article 43
\. (u) The costs o f the conciliators and all costs o f tire 
administration o f the conciliation proceedings shall be 
borne equally by the parties to tire proceedings, unless they 
agree otherwise.
■ (b) Wheit the conciliation proceedings have been in­
itiated. the conciliators shall be entitled to require an 
advance or security for the costs referred to in article 43, 
jraragraph 1 (a).
2. Each party sliall bear all expenses it incurs in 
connexion with the proceedings, unless the parties agree 
otherwise.
3. Notwithstandnig tire provisions o f article 43, para- 
graplis 1 and 2, the conciliators may. having decided 
unanimously that a party has brouglit a claim vcxatiously 
or frivolously, a.ssess against that party any or all ol the 
costs o f other parties to the proceedings. Such decision 
shall he Itrral atrd binding on all the parties.
Article 44
1. Failure o f a party to appear or to present its case at 
any stage o f the proceedings shall not be deemed an 
adtnissiott o f the other party’s assertions. Irr that event, the 
other party may, at its choice, request tire conciliators to 
close the proceedings or to deal with tlie questions 
presented to them and submit a recommendation in 
accordance with the provisions for making recommen­
dations set out in this Code.
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2. Before closing the proceedings, tlie conciliators siiall 
grant the party <faiUng to appear or to present its case, a 
period o f grace, not exceeding 10 days, unless they are 
satisfied tfiat the party does not intend to appear or to 
present its case.
3. Failure to observe procedural time-limits laid down in 
this Code or determined by the conciliators, in particular 
time-limits relating to the submission o f statements or 
intormation, shall be considered a failure to appear in the 
proceedings.
4. Where the proceedings have been closed owing to one 
party’s failure to appear or to present its case, the 
conciliators shall draw up a report noting that party’s 
failure.
Article 45
1. The conciliators shall follow the procedures stipulated 
in this Code.
2. The rules of procedure annexed to the present 
Convention shall be considered .as model rules for the 
guidance o f conciliators. The conciliators may, by mutual 
consent, use, supplement or amend the rules contained in 
the annex or formulate their own rules o f procedure to the 
extent that such supplementary, amended or other rules are 
not inconsistent w ith the provisions o f this Code.
3. I f  the parties agree that it may be in the interest o f 
achieving an expeditious and inexpensive solution o f the 
conciliation proceedings, they may mutually agree to rules 
o f procedure which are not inconsistent w itli the provisions 
o f this Code.
4. The conciliators shall formulate their recommen­
dation by consensus or failing that shall decide by majority 
vote.
5. The conciliation proceedings shall finish and the 
recommendation o f the conciliators shall be delivered not 
later than six months from the dale on which the 
conciliators are appointed, except in the cases referred to in 
article 23, paragraph 4 (e), (f), and (^), for which the lime 
limits in article 14, paragraph 1 and article 16, paragraph 4 
sliall be valid. I'he period o f six months may be extended 
by agreement o f the parties.
C. INSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY  
Article 46
1. Six montlis before the entry into force o f  the present 
Convention, the Secretary-General o f the United Nations 
shall, subject to the approval o f the General Assembly o f 
the United Nations, and taking into account the views 
expressed by the Contracting Parties, appoint a Registrar,
who may be assisted by such additional staff as may be 
necessary for the performance o f the functions listed in 
article 46, paragraph 2. Administrative services for the 
Registrar and his assistants shall be provided by the United 
Nations Office at Geneva.
2. The Registrar shall perform the following functions in 
consultation with the Contracting Parties as appropriate:
(a) Maintain the list o f conciliators o f the international 
panel o f conciliators and regularly inform the Contracting 
Parties o f the compusition o f the panel;
(b) Prirvide the names and addresses o f the conciliators 
to tlic pal lies concerned on request;
(c) Receive and maintain copies o f requests for 
conciliation, replies, recommendation, acceptances, or 
rejections, including reasons therefor;
(d) I'urnish on request, and at their cost, copies o f 
recommendations and reasons for rejection to the shippers’ 
oiganizations, conlerences and Governments, subject to the 
provisions o f article 4U;
(e) Make available information o f a non-confidential 
naiuie on completed conciliation cases, and without 
attribution to the pailies concerned,Tor the purposes o f 
preiiaration o f maleiial foi the Review Conference referred 
to in article 52; and
U'j The other I'unctions prescribed for the Registrar in 
article 26, paragraph 1 (c j and article 30, paragraphs 2 
and .1.
C 'hui>ter VII 
FINAL CLAUSES
A rticle 47 
IMPLEMENTATION
1. Each Coni rai ling Party shall take such legislative or 
other measures as may he necessary to implement the 
present Convention.
2. Each Contiacling I'aity shall communicate to the 
Secielaiy-Geneial ol the United Nations, who shall be the 
depusitaiy, the text ol the legislative or other measures 
which it has taken in older to implement the present 
Convention.
Article 48
s ig n a t u r e ;, r a t ie ic a t io n , a c c e p t a n c e ,
APPROVAL AND ACCESSION
I. The present Convention shall remain open for 
signature as from 1 July 1674 until and including 30 June 
1975 at United Nations Headquarters and sliall thereafter 
remain open for accession.
2. A ll States^* ate entitled to become Contracting Parties 
to the present Convention by;
(a) Signature subject to and followed by ratification, 
acceptance or approval; or
(b) Signature w ithout reservation as to ratification, 
acceptance or approval; or
(c) Accession.
3. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall 
be effected by the deposit o f an instrument to this effect 
with the depositary.
* A rticle 50 
DENUNCIATION
1. The present Convention may be denounced by any 
Contracting Party at any time after the expiration o f a 
period o f two years from the date on which the Convention 
has entered into force.
2. Denunciation sliall be notified to the depositary in 
writing, and shall .take effect.one year, or such longer 
period as may be specified in the instrument o f 
denuitciation, after the dale o f receipt by the depositary.
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Artic le  49 
ENTRY IN ’1'0 FORCE
1. The present Convention shall enter into force six 
months after the date on which not less than 24 States, the 
combined tonnage o f which amounts to at least 25 per cent 
o f world tonnage, have become Contracting Parlies to it in 
accordance w ith  article 48. For the purpose o f the iKesenl 
article the tonnage sliall be deemed to be that contained in 
Lloyd's Register o f  Shipping -  Statistical Tables 1973, 
table 2 “ World Fleets -  Analysis by Principal Types” , in 
respect to general cargo (including passengcr/cargo) ships 
and container (fu lly  cellular) ships, exclusive o f the United 
States reserve fleet and the American and Canadian Great 
Lakes fieels.'^
2. For each State which thereafter ratifies, accepts, 
approves o j accedes to it, the present Convention shall 
come into force six months after deposit by such Stale ol 
the appropriate instrument.
3. Any State which becomes a Contracting Party to the 
present Convention after the entry into force of an 
amendment shall, failing an expression o f a different 
intention by tlial Slate:
(a) Be considered as a Party, to the present Convention 
as amended; and
(h) Be considered as a Party to the unamended 
Convention in relation to any Parly to the present 
Convention not bound by the amendment.
? A t its 9th plenary meetliii; on 6 A p ril 1979, the Coiirerence 
adopted the fo llow iiii! understanding recommended by its Third 
Main Committee;
•Tn accordance w ith  its terms, the present Convention w ill be 
open to participation by all States, and the Secrelary-tjcnerul o f 
the United Nations w ill act as depositary. It is the understanding 
o f the Conference that the Secretary-General, in discharging his 
functions as depositary o f a convention or other m ultilateral 
legally binding instrument w ith an “ All-States”  clause, w ilt fo llow  
the practice o f the General Assembly ol the United Nations in 
implementing such a clause and, whenever advisable, w ill request 
the opinion o f the General Assembly belore receiving a sigriulure 
or an instrument o f ratification, acceptance, approval or ac­
cession.”
t> The tonnage requirements for the purposes o l article 49 
paragraph 1 are set out in part two below.
Article 51 
a m e n d m e n ts
1. Any Conlracling Parly may propose one or more 
amendments to the present Convention by communicating 
the amendments to the depositary. The depositary shall 
circulate such amendments among the Contracting Parlies, 
for their acceptance, and among States entitled to become 
Conlracling Patties to the present Convention which are 
not Contracting Parlies, for their infonpation.
2. Each proposed amendment circulated in accordance 
with article 51, paragraph 1 shall be deemed to have been 
accejited i f  no Conlracling Parly communicates an 
objection theielo to tlie depositary within 12 months 
following the dale o f its circulation by the depositary. 11 a 
Contracting Parly ctmmiunicates an objection to the 
proposed arnendinenl, such amendment shall not be 
consideied as accejiled and shall not be put into effect.
3. I f  no objection has been communicated, the 
amendment shall enter into force for all Contracting Parties 
six months aflei the expiry date o f the period o f 12 months 
referred to in article 51, paragraph 2.
Article 52
k i ;v if ;w c o n f e r e n c e s
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by Uie 
depositary five years from the date on which the present 
famveniion comes into force to review the working o f the 
Convention, with particular reference to its 
implementation, and to consider and adopt appropriate 
amendments.
2. The dejmsilaiy shall, four years from the date on 
which the present Convention conies into force, seek the 
views o f all .Slates entitled to attend the Review Conference 
and shall, on the basis o f the views received, prepare and 
circulate a draft agenda as well as amendments proposed for 
consideration by the ( onlerence.
3 Furlhei leview conferences shall be similarly 
conveneil every live years, or at any lime after the first 
Review Conleieiice, at the request ol one-third ol the
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Contracting Parties to the present Convention, unless tlie 
first Review Conference decides otherwise.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions o f article 52, 
paragraph 1, i f  the present Convention has not entered into 
force five years from the date o f the adoption o f the Final 
Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on a Code o f Conduct for Liner Conferences, a Review 
Conference sliall, at the request o f onc-tJiird o f the States 
entitled to become Contracting Parties to the present 
Convention, be convened by the Secretary-General o f the 
United Nations, .subject to the approval o f the General 
Assembly, in order to review the provisions of the 
Convention and its annex and to consider and adopt 
appropriate amendments.
Article 53 
FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPOSITARY
1. The depositary shall notify the signatory and acceding 
States of:
(a) Signatures, ratifications, acceptances, approvals and 
accessions in accordance with article 48;
(b) The date on which the present Convention enters 
into force in accordance with article 49;
(c j Denunciations o f the present Convention in 
accordance w ith  article 50;
(d) Reservations to the present Convention and the 
withdrawal o f reservations;
(c) The text o f the legislative or other measures which 
each Contracting Party has taken in order to implement the 
present Convention in accordance with article 47;
U ) Pfoposed amendments and objections to proposed 
amendments in accordance with article 51; and
(g) Entry into force o f amendments in accordance with 
article 51, paragraph 3.
2. The depositary shall also undertake such actions as 
are necessary under article 52.
A rticle 54 
AUTHENTIC TEXTS -- DEPOSIT
The original o f the present Convention, o f which the 
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, w ill be deposited with the 
Secretary-General o f the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, having been 
duly authorized to this effect by their respective 
Govermnents, have signed the present Convention, on the 
dates appearing opposite their signatures.
ANN I.X  TO THE CONVENTION
M ikIoI lulva of piuculuic loi intumatioiial mandatory conciliation
Rule I
1. Any jiatly wi.sliin(! lu instilule conciliution proceedings under 
llie Code shall addiess a leipiest 10 that effect in writing, 
ai'conipaiiied by a slateineiit of claim to Ihe other parly,andcopied 
to the Registrar.
2. I'he stalement of claim shall;
(o) Designate preci.scly each party to the dispute and state the 
address of each;
(h) Contain a summaiy statement of pertinent facts, the issues in 
dispute and Ihe claimant's pioposal for the settlement of the 
dispute;
(c) .Slate wlielhe.i an oial hearing is desired and, i.f so, and to the 
extent then known, the names and addresses of persons to give 
evidence, imlulling e.xpeils’ evidence, foi the claimant;
i>t) lie aeeoiiip.iiiied by sueli supporting documentation and 
lelevani agieeiiienls and aiiaiigemenls entered into by the parlies as 
Ihe cl.nmani may loii.sidei iieie.ssary at the lime o f making the 
claim.
( ‘ ‘j  iiidiiale the iiniiibei ol loncilialors rei|uiied, any proposal 
conceiniiig the a|>poniinieiii ol eoiicihatois, or the name of the 
eoiii'iliator apponileil by llu • hiimaiit in accoidaiiee willi article 32, 
paiagiaph 2, and
It
(!) Contain pioposaK. il ,iiiy, icgarding rules o f procedure.
J. Ihe slalenieiii ol i laini shall be dated and shall be signed by 
the paiiy.
t iu le  2
1. I f  the respondent decides to reply to the claim, he shall, 
wiihin .50 days following the date of his receipt of the statement of 
claiin, liansmil a legily lo ihe other party and copied to the 
Registrar.
2. The reply sliall:
(a) Coiilain a suiiiinaiy slaiement o f pertinent facts opposed to 
the conlenlioiis in Ihe statement of claim, the respondent’s 
propo.sal, if any, for the sellleinent of the dispute and any remedy 
claimed by him with a view lo the selllemenl o f the dispute;
(b) Stale whether an trial hearing is desired and, if so, and to the 
exieiil then known, the iianies and addresses of persons to give 
evidence, inehidirig experts' evidence, fox the rcspondeiit;
(c) lie accompanied by such supporting documentation and 
relevani agreements and arrangements entered into by the parties as 
the respondent may consider iieee.ssary at the lime of making the 
reply;
(U) Indicate the number of conciliators required, any proposal 
concerning the appoininieni of conciliators, or the name of the 
conciliator appointed by the respondent in accordance with 
arliclc 32, paragrapli 2; and
(cJ Contain proposals, if  any, regarding rules of procedure.
3. I'he reply shall be dated and shall be signed by the party.
Rule 3
1. Any person or other interest desiring lo participate in 
conciliation proceedings under article 34 shall transmit a written 
request to Ihe parlies lo the dispute, with a copy lo the Registrar.
2. I f  participation in accordance with fa) o f article 34 is desired, 
the request shall set forth Ihe grounds therefor, including the 
iilformalion required under rule 1, paragraph 2 (a), (h) and (d).
lOiqffin
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3. I f  p a rtic ip a ti^  in accordance w itli (b) o f article 34 is desired, 
the request shall state the grounds therefor and winch of the original 
parties would be supported.
4. Any objection to a request for joinder by such a party shall be 
sent by the objecting party, with a copy to the other parly, within 
seven days o f receipt o f the request.
5. In the event that two or more proceedings arc consolidated, 
subsequent requests for third-party participation sliall be trans­
mitted to all parlies concerned, each o f which may object in 
accordance with tlie present rule.
Kule 4
By agreement between tlie parties to a dispute, on motion by 
either party, and alter aflording the parties an ojrportunily ot being 
heard, the conciiiators may order the consolidation or separation ol 
all or any claims then pending between the same (larties.
Rule 5
1. Any party may challenge a conciliator wiiere circumstances 
exist that cause juslitiable doubts as to his independence.
2. Notice o f challenge, stating reasons tlierefor, should be made 
prior to the date o f the closing o f the proceedings, before the 
conciliators have rendered their recommendation. Any such 
challenge shall be heard promptly and shall be determined by 
majority vote o f the conciliators in the Irrst instance, us a 
prelintinary point, hr cases where more than one conciliator has 
been appointed. The decision in such cases shall be fina l.^
3. A conciliator who has died, resigned, become incapacitated or 
disqualified shall be replaced promptly.
4. Proceedings interrupted in this way shall continue Irom the 
point where they were interrupted, unle.ss it is agreed by the parties 
or ordered by the conciliators that a review or lehearing of any oral 
testimony lake place.
Rule 6
The conciliators shaU be judges o f their own jurisdiction and/or 
competence within tlie provisions o f the Code.
Rule 7
1. The conciliators shall receive and consider all written stale 
inents, documents, alfidavits, publications ot any other evidence, 
including oral evidence, which may be submitted to them by or on 
behalf o f any o f the patties, and shall give such weiglit thereto as in 
their judgement such evidence merits.
2. (a) Kach parly may submit to the conciliators any material it 
considers relevant, and at the lime o f such submission shall deliver 
certified copies to any ulhct parly to the proceedings, which party 
siiull be given a reasonable opportunity to reply thereto;
(b) The conciliators shall be the sole judges o f the relevance and 
materiahty o f the evidence submitted to them by the patties;
(c) The conciliators may ask the parties to produce such 
additional evidence as they may deem necessary to an understanding 
and determination o f the dispute, provided tlia i, i f  such additional 
evidence is produced, the other parlies to the proceedings shall have 
a reasonable opportunity to comment thereon.
R ules
1. Whenever a period o f days for tlie doing o f any act is provided 
for in the Code or in these rules, the day trom which the period
begins to tun shall not be counted, and the last day o f the period 
shall be counted, except where that last day is a Saturday, Sunday or 
a public holiday at the place o f conciUation, in which case the last 
day shall be the next business day.
2. When the lime provided for is less than seven days, inter­
mediate Satuidays, Sundays and public holidays shall be excluded 
from the compulation.
Rule 9
Subject to the provisions relating to procedural time-limits in the 
Code, the conciliators may, on a motion by one o f the parties or 
puisiianl to agreement between them, extend any such lime-limit 
which lias been fixed by the conciliators.
Rule 10
1. I he concilialois shall fix the order o f business and, unless 
otherwise agieeil, the dale and hour ol each session.
2. Unless the paities otherwise agree, the proceedmgs shall take 
place III piivale.
3. The conciliators slialt specillcally inquire o f all the parties 
whether they have any lurllier evidence to submit before declaring 
the pioceedings closed, and a noting thereul shall be recorded.
Rule U
t'oiicihalors' recoininendalions shall be in writing and sliall 
include:
(uj riie precise designullon and address ol each parly;
(hi A desciiplion ol the method of appointing conciliators, 
including I lieu nuiiies;
(c) 'I'lie dales and place of the conciliation proceedings;
(J) A suimnaiy of the lO iiciliatioii pioceedings, as the concili- 
alpiH deem appiopiiale.
(e) A suininuiy statement ol the facts lound by the conciliators, 
IJ) A summaiy o f the siilmiissions of the parlies;
/g/ Puniouiicenieiits on tlie issues in dispute, logeliier w ith the 
iea.sons tlie ic lo i,
(hj The signatiiies ol the conciliators and the dale o f each 
signaliiie, and
(i) An adilics.s loi the coniniunicalion o f the acceptance or 
leicclloii o f the ici oinim inlalion.
Rule 12
Ihe lecoinniendalioii shall, so fat as possible, contain a 
nounccniciil on uisls in uciordance w ith the provisions ol the Code. 
I f  the rcconiinendalion does not contain a fu ll pronouncement on 
costs. Ihe concilialois shall, as soon as possible alter the reconiinen- 
iluiiim , am) in any even) ivoi latei than 60 days ihercaller, ®
pronounceiiieiit in writing legaiding costs as provided in the Code.
Rule 13
Conciliators' tecomniendations shall also take into account 
previous and similar cases whenever this would facilitate a more 
un ifo iiii implemenlatioii ol the Code and observance o f conciUators 
recommendations.
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Annex 11
RESOLLTIIONS ADOITED »Y H IE CONI IJIti N t E
1. Completion o f the work o f tlie Conference
77ie United Nations Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on a 
Code o f  Conduct fo r  Liner Conferences,
Having met in accordance w illi General Assembly 
resolution 3035 (X X V ll) o f 19 December 1972 to consider 
and adopt a convention or any other multilaterid legally 
binding instrument on a code o f conduct for liner 
conferences,
Having agreed unanimously in respect o f a large number 
o f paragraphs contained in the draft code o f conduct for 
liner conferences annexed to the reports o f the three main 
cormnittees o f the Conference o f Plenipotentiaries,
Having noted that the principles in regard to the 
settlement o f some fundamental issues before the United 
Nations Conference o f Plenipotentiaries for a Code o f 
Conduct for Liner Conferences submitted by the President 
o f the Conference, and annexed to this resolution, have 
been accepted, among the States participating in the 
Conference, by all developing, countries, all socialist 
countries o f Eastern Euro])e and a number o f developed 
market-economy countries, and having noted also that a 
number o f other develojjed market-economy countries have 
not accepted the above-mentioned principles and that a 
number o f other such countries have rcsei'ved their position 
on the subject,
Taking note that all countries which have accepted the 
principles referred to in the preceding paragraph have 
agreed that these principles shall form the basis o f further 
work on the relevant sections o f the draft code o f conduct 
for liner conferences,
Taking note also o f the views o f countries which have 
not accepted the principles referred to above and the desire 
o f these countries that their views be taken into account in 
the further work,
1. Takes note o f the substantial progress achieved during 
the first part o f the Conference;
2. Takes note also o f the report on the plenary meetings 
o f the Conference and o f the reports o f its three main 
corrunitiees;
3. Considers that tire best interests o f all countries will 
be served by a resumption o f the United Nations 
Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on a Code o f Conduct for
Liner Confeieiue.s In (lenevu on 11 March 1974 for a 
perioil o f ihiee weeks in o/der that it may complete its task;
4. iiainests the .Sei lelaiy-General o f the United Nations 
and the Sccielai y-Geneial o f UNCTAD to make 
airangemenis foi the le.snmption o f the Conference o f 
Plenipotentiaries accoidmgly;
5. Affirms that the large number o f paragraphs agreed 
unanimously and contained in the draft code o f conduct 
for liner conferences annexed to the reports o f the three 
main committees o f the Conference o f Plenipotentiaries 
shall not be reopened for any further discussion or for 
changes in the texts o f these paragraplia, with the exception 
o f any editorial and/or legal drafting changes that may be 
deemed necessary;
6. Notes the agreement o f all countries who have 
accepted the principles in regard to the settlement o f some 
fundamental issues before the United Nations Conference 
submitted by the President o f the Conference, and annexed 
to this resolution, to continue to regard these principles as 
the basis for further work at the resumed Conference o f 
Plenipotentiaries and not to reopen discussion on these 
principles and also not to reopen for any further discussion 
or changes the relevant paiagraphs o f the draft code agreed 
by ail such countries, and based on these principles, w ith 
the exception o f any editorial and/or legal drafting changes 
that may be deemed necessary or any other drafting 
changes considered necessary for securing improved con­
form ity o f the texts o f these paragraphs with tire agreed 
princijrles;
7. Confirms the willingness o f ail parties to this resol­
ution to continue negotiations at the resumed Conference 
o f Plenipotentiaries from the stage reached at its adjourn­
ment with a view to considering and adopting at tlie 
resumed conference a convention or any other multilateral 
legally binding instrument on a code o f conduct for liner 
conferences;
8. Requests the UNCTAD secretariat to prepare texts in 
legal language in respect o f texts annexed to the reports o f 
the main committees o f the Conference and to circulate 
such texts to the Governments o f all member States as an 
aid to their consideration well in advance o f the resumption 
o f the Conference o f Plenipotentiaries.
6th plenary meeting 
15 December 1973
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ANNEX TO RESOLUTION I
Principles in regard to the settlement of some fundamental issues 
before the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a 
Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences
A. Role o f  Governm ent
] . Upon the request of Governments, requisite infurmatiun is to 
be furnished by the conferences.
2. Government representatives are to have tlie right to be present 
during consultations, to participate in tire iliscussioiis fully, to make 
suggestions, and to promote agreement between the parties, but 
they shall have no role of a decision-maker.
3. Governments are to have a similar right of participation in 
conciliation proceedings.
• D. Particiim tion in trade
1. Equality of the rights of national lines at the two ends.
2. A share of 2U per cent is to be allocated to third-flag lines 
where tliey exist.
3. If  national lines do not carry, or are unable to carry, their 
allocated share of the trade -  and on this point tliey themselves 
shall make the decision -  that portion of their share of the trade 
which tliey do not carry will revert to tlie pool to be shared pro  
rata.
4. National lines within a region at one end are to liave the 
flexibility of adjustments among theiuscives in regard to their 
shares.
C. Implementation
1. Every effort is to be made by the parties to reach a settlenienl 
during consultations.
2. Where a matter is not settled by consultation and a dispute 
arises, it should be submitted to mandatory international conci­
liation; among such matters are qucstions.relating to freiglit rates, 
surcharges, and currency adjustment factors.
3. Conciliators' recommendations, if accepted by the parties, 
shall be binding.
4. I f  conciliators’ recommendations are rejected, reasons for their 
rejection ate to be staled comprehensively in writing and published.
5. A review conference is to be convened after five years to 
review the working of the convention with particular reference to 
implementation. Such review conferences aie to be held every five 
years thereafter.
D. Criteria fo r  the determination o f  fre ight rates
1. These criteria should be as contained in the proposal sub­
mitted by the socialist countries of Eastern Europe for paragraph S4 
of the Code.*
■ For the text o f this proposal, which was subsequently spon­
sored also by the Group o f 77 and by France, see alternative 1 to 
paragraph 54 o f the Code in United Nations Conference o f  
Plenipotentiaries on a Code o f Conduct fo r  Liner Conferences, 
vol. 1, Reports and other documents (United Nations publication. 
Sales No. £.75.11.1). 11), part four, sect. 1.
2. I'he tinie belween the date when one general freight-rate 
increa.sc becomes elfcctive anil the date of notice of the next general 
lieighi late increase sliould not be less than 12 months.
Note. Keleiencc was made to the apprehensions among different 
groups in regaid to the question of outside competition, but the 
liope was expressed that tliis problem would be satisfactorily 
resolved by niuiuul discussion m the Committee or drafting group 
cuiiceined.
2. Noii-cuiifcrence shipping lines
The Uiiiied Nuluma Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on a 
Code u fC oitd tii'l fo r fin e r Conferences,
llavitig prt'iMtred llic ('(invention on a Code o f Conduct 
for Liner Confeienccs w illi a view to improving the liner 
conlerence system,
Bearing in mind Itial the Convention is applicable to liner 
coiifereiices and llieii external relations,
Rest/lves that:
I. Notliing ill llia l Converilion ^lall be construed so as 
to deny sliippeis an nplion in the cliotce between confer­
ence slii|)ping lines and non-conference shipping lines 
subject to any loyally aiiangenients where they exist;
1. Non-conlciciice shipping lines competing w ith a 
coni'eience should adheie to the principle of fair compe- 
tilio ii on u conniieiciiil basis;
.1. In the iiueiesi of sound development o f liner shipping 
service, non-conference shipping lines should not be pre- 
venled from operating as long as tliey comply with the 
reijiiireinenls o f parugia])h 2 above.
9th plenary meeting 
6 A p ril 1974
i .  Local conciliation
The United Nations Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on a 
Code o f  Conduct fo r Liner Conferences,
Bearing in mind the importance o f the consultation 
provisions and the dispute settlement procedures provided 
in the Convention on ,a Code o f Conduct for Liner 
Conferences,
Noting that proposals were made to provide in the Code 
for submitling some disjuites to local conciliation,
1. Reiptests the first Review Conference to be convened in 
accordance with article 52 o f the Convention to give 
priority consideration lo the subject o f local conciliation, 
taking into account the views expressed by the Contracting 
Parlies to the Convention on whether or not the absence o f' 
local conciliation has hampered the effective settlement o f
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disputes and, i f  so, which subjects should be considered 
appropriate for liStal conciliation and what procedures 
should be applied for resolving such disputes.
2. Agrees that in preparing for the Review Conference the 
depositary shall seek the views o f all States entitled to
attend the Review Cunfeience, which should be required to 
take into account the views expressed by appropriate 
authorities, liner conferences and shippers’ organizations.
9 th plenary meeting 
■ 6 A p ril 1974
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